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TURTLES ALL THE WAY DOWN1: A CLEARER
UNDERSTANDING OF THE SCOPE OF WATERS OF
THE UNITED STATES BASED ON THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS
JESSE J. RICHARDSON, JR.,* TIFFANY DOWELL LASHMET** & GATLIN
SQUIRES***

INTRODUCTION
The meaning of “waters of the United States”2 under the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”) has been debated in Congress, federal agencies, and
courtrooms across the country for almost fifty years. Despite the longstanding attention to the term, most consider the term even more unclear
today than in 1972 when the CWA was adopted.3 However, a methodical
examination of the statutory and regulatory history and the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions on the issue reveal more consensus than previously understood. In addition, this focused examination shows that the debate
centers on one problem that the arguments rarely acknowledge: wetlands
adjacent to a “tributary.” Specifically, litigants and agencies attempt to
show that the wetland at issue lies close to some type of water, whether
a ditch, drain, or creek. If that water eventually reaches a navigable water,
no matter how indirect or attenuated the path, the wetland is arguably
jurisdictional.4 This Article distills the issues and clarifies the agreements and controversies surrounding “waters of the United States.”
The meaning of the phrase “waters of the United States” has been
debated in the legislature, federal agencies, and courtrooms across the
country since Congress adopted the CWA in 1972.5 The debate intensified
1

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 754 n.14 (2006).
Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
**
Associate Professor and Extension Specialist—Agricultural Law, Texas A&M AgriLife
Extension.
***
Attorney, Agriculture and Equine Industry Group at McAfee & Taft, A Professional
Corporation and former research fellow at the National Agricultural Law Center.
2
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1151, sec. 502(7)
(1972).
3
Id.
4
EPA, About Waters of the United States (Sept. 12, 2021, 6:08 PM), https://www.epa
.gov/wotus/about-waters-united-states [https://perma.cc/NP7C-YVJC].
5
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beginning in 1985 and now forms the focus of much rule-making and
litigation.6 Section 404 of the CWA prohibits the discharge of dredged or
fill material into the “navigable waters.”7 Navigable waters mean the
“waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”8 The term
waters of the United States, as used in the CWA, was not further defined
by Congress.
This Article first provides a brief overview of the history and background of the CWA and the regulations thereunder.9 The history reflects
a shift in focus from commerce to environmental protection.10 U.S. Supreme Court case law interpreting the meaning of waters of the United
States (“WOTUS”) is then examined. The Article then reviews the 2015
WOTUS Rule (“Obama Rule”) and the 2020 Navigable Waters Protection
Rule (“Trump Rule”).11 The Article also explores the applications of deference to the agency in various cases and how judicial deference may evolve
in the future.12 Given the attention of case law on the definition of tributaries and adjacency of wetlands to tributaries, those issues form the
Article’s focus.
I.

BACKGROUND

The difficulties in defining the jurisdictional reach of federal
regulations addressing water contamination began even before the CWA
was passed. The evolution of the regulation reflects a winding path that
led from regulating commerce to regulating the environment. One relative constant during the development was the struggle to determine the
scope of federal oversight or what waters came under the federal government’s purview.
In turn, the debate pivots on how far Congress, the Agencies, and
the Court wish to stretch the Commerce Clause13 in the pursuit of clean
water. The Commerce Clause states that Congress holds the authority
6

Id.
33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (2021).
8
Id. § 1362(7).
9
See discussion infra Part I.
10
See generally Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a National Water Policy
and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REV. 873 (1993) (providing a comprehensive and enlightening review of the history and background of the Clean
Water Act, explaining in part the present difficulties in fitting the regulations to wetlands).
11
See discussion infra Parts II, III.
12
See discussion infra Part II.
13
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
7
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“to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes.”14 The limits of the Commerce Clause have
forced regulators to take odd approaches to, most prominently, protecting
wetlands. Unlike the federal government, the states may regulate wetlands directly.15
A.

Precursors to the Clean Water Act

The precursors to the CWA focused on the obstruction of navigable
waters. The framework imposed by U.S. Constitution, however, proved
“awkward,” as the states could not regulate interstate commerce, but no
existing law prevented obstruction of navigable waters.16 Congress attempted to address the issue by passing various Rivers and Harbors Act,
including the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.17 Section 13 of the Act,
referred to as the Refuse Act, prohibits the discharge of “refuse matter”
from floating craft, the shore, or manufacturing establishments into any
“navigable water” or “any tributary of any navigable water” unless permitted by the Secretary of the Army upon application.18 Discharge of
liquids from streets and sewers are excepted.19
Although passed to prevent obstructions to navigation, Section 13
evolved into a pollution prevention statute.20 A pair of decisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned the application of the act to pollutants.
The first found that industrial solid waste, upon settling, constituted an
obstruction of waterways.21 The second held that commercially valuable
aviation fluid could be “refuse” and that refuse includes substances harmful to waterways, like pollutants.22 In 1970, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held in Zabel v. Tabb23 that the Corps of Engineers
(“Corps”) must consider ecological considerations when issuing permits
under Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.24
14

Id.
ENV’‘T L. INST., STATE WETLAND PROTECTION: STATUS, TRENDS, & MODEL APPROACHES
6 (2008).
16
Kalen, supra note 10, at 879.
17
Ch. 425, § 9, 30 Sta. 1121 (1899); see also Kalen, supra note 10, at 879 (discussing Congress’s adoption of the Act).
18
Ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (1899) (codified as 33 U.S.C.A. § 407).
19
Id.
20
Kalen, supra note 10, at 880–81.
21
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485, 488–89 (1960).
22
United States v. Standard Oil Company, 384 U.S. 224, 229–30 (1966).
23
Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
24
Id. at 201.
15
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Soon after the Zabel decision, and in response to an Executive Order
by President Richard Nixon,25 the Corps of Engineers issued a notice of
proposed rule-making.26 On April 7, 1971, the Corps delivered a final regulation27 that established a permitting program for discharges into navigable waters or their tributaries.28 The regulation would have prohibited
discharges into “navigable waters of the United States or into any tributary from which discharged or deposited matter shall float or be washed
into a navigable water.”29 Yet, one federal court declared the program ultra
vires before its full implementation.30 In a foreshadowing of arguments that
still plague the courts, the Kalur court found that the Refuse Act authorized the issuance of permits for discharges in navigable waters, but the
Act failed to include language that included non-navigable tributaries.31
In response to Kalur, the Corps promulgated a narrower definition of navigable waters under the Rivers and Harbors Act in 1972.32 The
regulation defined navigable waters of the United States as “waters which
are presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.”33
Also, in 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control
Amendments of 1972 (“FWPCA”).34 The Amendments included the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) and a program, under
Section 404, for issuing permits for discharges of dredge or fill material.35
The FWPCA defined navigable waters as “waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas.”36 Courts, relying on legislative debates on
the FWPCA, interpreted the Corps’s jurisdiction broadly.37 At the same
time, however, the Corps of Engineers attempted to narrow the definition.

25

Exec. Order No. 11,574, reprinted in 35 Fed. Reg. 19627 (1970).
Permits for Discharges or Deposits into Navigable Waters, 35 Fed. Reg. 20,005 (proposed Dec. 31, 1970) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 209).
27
Permits for Discharges or Deposits into Navigable Waters, 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Apr. 7,
1971) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. §. 209).
28
Kalen, supra note 10, at 883–85.
29
Permits for Discharges or Deposits into Navigable Waters, 36 Fed. Reg. at 6564–66.
30
Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1971).
31
Id.
32
33 C.F.R. § 209 (1972).
33
Definition of Navigable Waters of the United States, 37 Fed Reg. 18,289, 18,290 (Sept. 9,
1972) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 209).
34
Pub. L. No. 92-500 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376).
35
Id.
36
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2021).
37
Kalen, supra note 10, at 891.
26
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Specifically, the Corps proposed regulations that limited waters of the
United States to those waters “which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the future
susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.”38
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia took exception,
finding that Congress intended for jurisdiction to extend to the maximum
extent possible and beyond traditional notions of navigable waters.39 The
Corps of Engineers obliged, proposing a lengthy definition of navigable
waters of the United States that included, inter alia40:
(d)

(e)

(f)
(g)

38

All artificially created channels and canals used for
recreational or other navigational purposes that
are connected to other navigable waters, landward
to their ordinary high water mark;
All tributaries of navigable waters of the United
States up to their headwaters and landward to their
ordinary high water mark;
Interstate waters landward to their ordinary high
water mark and up to their headwaters;
Intrastate lakes, rivers and streams landward to
their ordinary high water mark and up to their headwaters that are utilized: (1) By interstate travelers
for water related recreational purposes; (2) For the
removal of fish that are sold in interstate commerce;

Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115,
12,119 (Apr. 3, 1974) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 209).
39
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
40
The first three categories were:
(a) Coastal waters that are navigable waters of the United States
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, shoreward to their mean high
water mark (mean higher high water mark on the Pacific coast); (b) All
coastal wetlands, mudflats, swamps, and similar areas that are contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters. “Coastal wetlands” includes
marshes and shallows and means those areas periodically inundated
by saline or brackish waters and that are normally characterized by the
prevalence of salt or brackish water vegetation capable of growth and
reproduction; (c) Rivers, lakes, streams, and artificial water bodies that
are navigable waters of the United States up to their headwaters and
landward to their ordinary high water mark . . .
Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320,
31,324–25 (July 25, 1974) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 209).
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(3) For industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce; or (4) In the production of agricultural commodities sold or transported in interstate
commerce;
Freshwater wetlands including marshes, shallows,
swamps and, similar areas that are contiguous or
adjacent to other navigable waters and that support freshwater vegetation. “Freshwater wetlands”
means those areas that are periodically inundated
and that are normally characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that requires saturated soil
conditions for growth and reproduction;
Those other waters which the District Engineer determines necessitate regulation for the protection
of water quality as expressed in the guidelines (40
CFR 230). For example, in the case of intermittent
rivers, streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands—
that are not contiguous or adjacent to navigable
waters identified in paragraphs (a)–(h), a decision on
jurisdiction shall be made by the District Engineer.41

The 1977 Regulation

In 1977, the Corps amended the regulations again, “consolidating”
the definition of waters of the United States into four categories.42 Category 1 included “[c]oastal and inland waters, lakes, rivers, and streams
that are navigable waters of the United States, including adjacent wetlands.”43 Category 2 comprised “[t]ributaries to navigable waters of the
United States, including adjacent wetlands.”44 The Corps incorporated
within the definition of Category 2 waters the “statement that nontidal
drainage and irrigation ditches that feed into navigable waters will not
be considered ‘waters of the United States,’” covering these activities
under other programs of the FWPCA.45

41

Id. at 31,324–25.
Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,127–28
(July 19, 1977).
43
Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. at 33,127.
44
Id.
45
Id.
42
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Category 3 waters focused upon “[i]nterstate waters and their tributaries, including adjacent wetlands.”46 Category 4 constituted a catch-all
provision, referring to “all other waters . . . the degradation or destruction
of which could affect interstate commerce.”47 These waters could include
isolated waters or isolated wetlands, intermittent streams, or isolated
waters like prairie potholes.48 This category comprises waters not part of
a tributary system for interstate or navigable waters of the United States.49
Impacts on the quality of these waters impact interstate commerce.50
The definition of adjacent was also added in 1977.51 The Corps
defined adjacent as “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or
barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are ‘adjacent
wetlands.’”52 The regulations also defined the ordinary high-water mark
and tidal waters.53
Later in 1977, Congress amended the FWPCA with the CWA and
“once again rendered the Corps’s regulations obsolete.”54 These amendments authorized general permits, provided exemptions from the program, and added Section 404(g), which allowed states to administer their
own permitting programs.55
The legislative debates over these amendments are detailed extensively in many court opinions and scholarly publications with respect to
gleaning the scope of waters of the United States. The debates clearly
show Congress’s desire to protect wetlands and the rejection of limiting
navigable waters under the Act to navigable-in-fact waters.56 The debates
also indicated that Congress recognized the Corps’s authority over Category
1, 2, and 3 waters.57 On the other hand, Congress contemplated that
states would hold authority over “more jurisdictionally attenuated areas”
in Category 4, like isolated waters and intermittent streams.58
46

Id.
Id.
48
See Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37122, 37,126
(July 19, 1977).
49
See id.
50
See id. at 37,128.
51
See id. at 37,144.
52
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (1977).
53
Id. § 328.3(e)–(f).
54
Kalen, supra note 10, at 897–98.
55
See id.
56
See id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
47
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The 1980/1982 Regulation

In May of 1980, the EPA passed additional regulations defining
the meaning of waters of the United States as used in the CWA.59 In
1982, the Corps of Engineers adopted an identical definition.60 These
regulations listed seven categories of WOTUS:
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

All waters which are currently used, or were used
in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats,
sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet
meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i)
Which are or could be used by interstate or
foreign travelers for recreational or other
purposes; or
(ii)
From which fish or shellfish are or could be
taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii)
Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by industries in interstate
commerce;
All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as
waters of the United States under the definition;
Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs
(a)(1) through (4) of this section;
The territorial seas;
Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that
are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs
(a)(1) through (6) of this section.61

59
Final Rule, Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,424 (May 19,
1980) (codified in 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (1981)).
60
Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47 Fed. Reg.
31794, 31,811 (July 22, 1982) (codified in 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1983)).
61
Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,424 (May 19, 1980) (codified
in 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (1981)).
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Courts, regulatory disputes, and this Article focus on the scope of the
terms tributaries and adjacent wetlands (subsections (5) and (7) of the
1980 definition). Although not clearly articulated by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the question centers upon the expansion of jurisdiction resulting
from the inclusion of wetlands adjacent to a tributary that flow into
another tributary and then another before finally emptying into traditional navigable waters. The authors refer to this issue as the “tributary
of a tributary of a tributary” issue, or “chain jurisdiction.”
In defining the term “wetlands,” 33 C.F.R. section 328.3(b) provided
that:
The term wetlands means those areas that are inundated
or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and
duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.62
While the 1980/1982 regulations defined neither “intermittent” nor “tributary,” the definition of “adjacent” from the 1977 regulation remained.63
D.

1986 Clarifying Regulations

In 1986, the agencies adopted regulations “clarifying” the definition of WOTUS by adding what became known as the Migratory Bird
Rule. Under this regulation:
[The] EPA . . . clarified that waters of the United States at
40 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) also include waters:
(a)
Which are or would be used as habitat by birds
protected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or
(b)
Which are or would be used as habitat by other
migratory birds which cross state lines; or
(c)
Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or
(d)
Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.64
62

Id.
Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,144 (July 19,
1977).
64
Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
63
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This inclusion of the Migratory Bird Rule expanded the scope of the
waters of the United States definition.
E.

1993 Regulation

In 1993, the EPA and Corps codified “the current policy that prior
converted croplands are not waters of the United States.”65 The definition
was otherwise unchanged, but this regulation clarified that the definition
does not include areas that had previously been drained of water and
converted to agricultural use.
F.

2000 Final Notice of Issuance and Modification of Nationwide
Permits

The Corps discussed intermittent streams and ephemeral streams
as tributaries of waters of the United States in a 2000 Final Notice of
Issuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits66:
Intermittent stream: An intermittent stream has flowing
water during certain times of the year, when groundwater
provides water for stream flow. During dry periods, intermittent streams may not have flowing water. Runoff from
rainfall is a supplemental source of water for stream flow.67
Ephemeral stream: An ephemeral stream has flowing
water only during, and for a short duration after, precipitation events in a typical year. Ephemeral stream beds are
located above the water table year-round. Groundwater is
not a source of water for the stream. Runoff from rainfall
is the primary source of water for stream flow.68
This guidance stated that “ephemeral streams that are tributary
to other waters of the United States are waters of the United States, as
long as they possess an ordinary high water mark.”69 Similarly, perennial
65

Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,033
(Aug. 25, 1993).
66
Final Notice of Issuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,818,
12,823 (Mar. 9, 2000).
67
Id. at 12,898.
68
Id. at 12,897.
69
Id. at 12,823.
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and intermittent streams were likewise jurisdictional so long as they
possessed the required physical ordinary high-water mark.
II.

CASE LAW

Although countless cases address the meaning and scope of
“waters of the United States,” only a handful of critical U.S. Supreme Court
cases examine this issue. This section summarizes those three cases,
highlighting the key issues addressed by the Court in attempting to define waters of the United States. Additionally, the question of whether
the Court should defer to the agency forms a fundamental issue underlying cases challenging the scope of the WOTUS definition.
A.

Deference to the Agency

The level of deference the Court should afford the agency forms
a recurring theme in the cases and plays prominently in the latest attempts at rule-making. Deference to an agency’s construction of a statute
that the agency administers derives from the standard announced in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.70 That case
addressed the standard of review when a court reviews an agency’s
construction of a statute that the agency administers.71 Referred to as
“Chevron deference,” the test consists of two steps.72 First, the courts ask
whether Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”73
If so, the intent of Congress is clear and controls. If Congressional intent
is not clear, the courts ask whether “the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”74 If so, a court will defer to the
agency interpretation.
B.

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
(1985)

The question presented in this case was whether the CWA authorizes the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to require landowners to obtain
70

467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
Id.
72
See generally Note, Chevron and the Substantive Canons: A Categorical Distinction, 124
HARV. L. REV. 594 (2010).
73
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
74
Id. at 843.
71
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permits from the Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands
adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries.75 The wetlands
at issue lie “near” the shores of Lake St. Clair in Michigan.76 Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc. (“Riverside Bayview”) began placing fill materials
on the property to prepare a housing development site.77 The Corps of
Engineers filed suit to enjoin Riverside Bayview from filling the property,
alleging that Riverside Bayview was discharging fill material into waters
of the United States, namely an adjacent wetland, without a permit.78
The U.S. District Court found that the property constituted an
adjacent wetland and enjoined Riverside Bayview from filling the wetland
without a permit.79 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that wetlands are not subject to CWA jurisdiction where, as
here, the wetlands were not subject to flooding by adjacent navigable
waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth of aquatic vegetation.80 The Sixth Circuit, troubled by its belief that a different reading
would implicate the Constitution’s Takings Clause, did not grant deference to the Corps’s interpretation.81 The court narrowly construed the
statute and implementing regulations to avoid the finding of a taking
without just compensation.82
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed.83
Addressing the issue of a taking, the Court opined that neither a permit
requirement nor a denial of a permit necessarily constitutes a taking.84
Further, the fact that a permitting scheme may result in a taking in
some circumstances does not justify a narrow construction of the statutes
and regulations.85 The Tucker Act provides a means for obtaining compensation for a taking in those cases where a taking occurs so that taking
is not a consideration in statutory construction.86
The main issue addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the
wetland at issue was adjacent.87 After dispensing with the regulatory
75

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985).
Id. at 124.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 125.
80
Id.
81
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 126.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 121.
84
Id. at 127.
85
Id. at 128.
86
Id.
87
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 126.
76

2021]

TURTLES ALL THE WAY DOWN

13

taking issue, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the wetland
characteristics must result from flooding from the adjacent wetland, noting
that the regulation referred to inundation from either surface water or
groundwater.88 Here, groundwater provides the source of the saturated
soil conditions characteristic of a wetland.89 The Court then found that
the wetland was adjacent given that “the area characterized by saturated
soil conditions and wetland vegetation extended beyond the boundary of
[the] property to Black Creek, a navigable waterway.”90 Later in the opinion, the Court noted that the wetland at issue “actually abuts on a
navigable waterway.”91
The bulk of the opinion discusses whether the Corps’s inclusion of
adjacent wetlands as WOTUS was reasonable. The Court explicitly applied Chevron deference.92 The Court glossed over the first step, presumably finding that Congress had not spoken clearly on the issue.93 Given
the ambiguity, the Court held that the Corps’s interpretation that the
abutting wetlands were waters of the United States was reasonable.94
Finding that the Corps “must necessarily choose some point at
which water ends and land begins,” the Court found that defining adjacent wetlands as “waters” under the CWA was reasonable.95 Despite
finding that the term “navigable” is of “limited import” in the Act, the
Court noted that including wetlands as “waters” entailed a more nuanced
analysis.96 However, the Corps’s conclusion that “wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters do as a general matter play a key role in protecting and
enhancing water quality” was reasonable.97
Footnote 9 to the opinion laid out the reasoning for finding the
regulation reasonable in more detail:
Of course, it may well be that not every adjacent wetland is
of great importance to the environment of adjoining bodies
of water. But the existence of such cases does not seriously
undermine the Corps’ decision to define all adjacent
88

Id. at 129–30 (emphasis added).
Id. at 130–31.
90
Id. at 131.
91
Id. at 135.
92
Id. at 131.
93
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 132–34.
96
Id. at 133.
97
Id.
89

14
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wetlands as “waters.” If it is reasonable for the Corps to
conclude that in the majority of cases, adjacent wetlands
have significant effects on water quality and the aquatic
ecosystem, its definition can stand. That the definition may
include some wetlands that are not significantly intertwined
with the ecosystem of adjacent waterways is of little moment, for where it appears that a wetland covered by the
Corps’ definition is in fact lacking in importance to the
aquatic environment—or where its importance is outweighed by other values—the Corps may always allow
development of the wetland for other uses simply by issuing a permit.98
This opinion in Riverside Bayview set the course for the Supreme
Court’s analysis for years to come. Although the decision was unanimous,
interpretations by justices in the cases that followed vary dramatically.
In part, the varying interpretations may be due to the limited holding in
Riverside Bayview—that wetlands abutting a navigable waterway are
WOTUS.99 Later opinions have interpreted the holding to go far beyond
this modest proposition. The dissenting opinion in Rapanos characterized
the Riverside Bayview holding as encompassing wetlands adjacent to
tributaries.100 Although Riverside Bayview often used the phrase “and
their tributaries,” the facts of the case involved only a wetland adjacent
to waters navigable-in-fact.101
The majority opinion in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”)102 characterized the Court’s opinion in Riverside Bayview as holding that the Corps
has jurisdiction over “wetlands that actually abutted on a navigable waterway.”103 Indeed, the Court’s ultimate holding in Riverside Bayview found
that “[b]ecause respondent’s property is part of a wetland that actually
abuts on a navigable waterway, respondent was required to have a permit
in this case.”104
98

Id. at 135, n.9 (citations omitted).
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 122.
100
Rapanos v United States, 547 U.S. 715, at 792–93 (2006).
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Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 123.
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531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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Id. at 167.
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Although the wetland at issue in Riverside Bayview is consistently
referred to as abutting the navigable water, the Dissent in SWANCC, in
an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, inexplicably characterize the
wetlands at issue in Riverside Bayview as a “parcel of low-lying marshy
land that was not itself navigable, directly adjacent to navigable water,
or even hydrologically connected to navigable water, but which was a part
of a larger area, characterized by poor drainage, that ultimately abutted
a navigable creek.”105 Interestingly, Justice Stevens also authored the dissenting opinion in Rapanos, which acknowledges that wetland at issue
in Riverside Bayview “abutted” a navigable waterway.106
According to the plurality in Rapanos, Riverside Bayview stands
for the narrow proposition that, even though not all adjacent wetlands
have a substantial nexus to navigable waters, to interpret all adjacent
wetlands as covered by the CWA is reasonable.107 The Rapanos plurality
also noted that “adjacent” and “adjoining” are used interchangeably in
footnote 9 of the Riverside Bayview opinion.108
C.

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (“SWANCC”)

The SWANCC case considered whether the Corps had jurisdiction
over an abandoned sand and gravel pit with excavation trenches that
had evolved into permanent and seasonal ponds.109 The Corps asserted
jurisdiction under the Migratory Bird Rule, which “clarified” the definition of waters of the United States in 1986.110 The 1986 definition stated
that WOTUS includes intrastate waters that, inter alia, provide habitat
for migratory birds.111 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that the Migratory Bird Rule was a reasonable interpretation of the
CWA and the Commerce Clause gave Congress authority to regulate
such waters based on the cumulative impact theory.112
105

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs,
531 U.S. 159, 175–76 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). An extensive search revealed no
similar description of the wetland at issue in Riverside Bayview. The Court’s opinion in
that case referred to the wetland as “actually abut[ting] a navigable waterway.” See
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135.
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Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 792.
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Id. at 747.
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Id. (citing Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136, n.9).
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Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 162.
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in a 5–4 decision, with Chief
Justice Rehnquist writing the majority opinion.113 The Migratory Bird
Rule, according to the majority, failed to find support in the CWA.114
The Supreme Court found that, in applying step 1 of Chevron
deference, Congress spoke clearly in Section 404 of the CWA: Waters are
not considered WOTUS if the only link to navigable waterways is migratory birds.115 The Court stated that the CWA would not allow it to hold
“that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that are not adjacent
to open water.”116 “We find § 404(a) to be clear, but even were we to [find
that Congress has not clearly spoken to the precise issue], we would not
extend Chevron deference here.”117 The arguments supporting jurisdiction based on the Migratory Bird Rule “raise significant constitutional
questions.”118 Upholding jurisdiction based on the Rule would “result in
serious impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over
land and water use.”119 Therefore, deference would not be given, and the
Migratory Bird Rule would be rejected.
The Corps argued that Congress’s failure to pass proposed legislation to reject the Corps’s 1977 regulations expanding the reach of the
CWA and the Corps’s jurisdiction in a portion of the Act constituted Congressional acquiescence.120 However, “failed legislative proposals are ‘a
particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a
prior statute.’”121 “[S]ubsequent history is less illuminating than the contemporaneous evidence.”122
The Corps also argued that the regulation reasonably implements
Congressional intent given the commercial nature of the proposed landfill.123 However, the statute confers jurisdiction to “navigable waters” and
“waters and the United States” and fails to mention or consider commercial activity.124

113
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The Court, employing the term “significant nexus” for the first time
in a CWA case, stated that “the significant nexus between the wetlands
and “navigable waters . . .” informed [the Court’s] reading of the CWA in
Riverside Bayview Homes.”125 Riverside Bayview did not address the “question of authority of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into
wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water.”126 According to the
SWANCC majority, the text of the CWA “will not allow” a holding “that
the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that are not adjacent to
open water.”127 The holding in SWANCC can reasonably be interpreted
as finding that isolated waters or isolated wetlands, with no adjacency,
are not WOTUS. The case addressed neither the meaning of adjacency
nor what type of waters qualify for adjacency. The Court never mentioned substantial nexus again in the opinion, nor did the Court expound
upon the meaning of the term.
The dissenting opinion would have upheld the Corps interpretation
as reasonable under Chevron deference.128 In particular, the dissenting Justices characterized the majority as “draw[ing] a new jurisdictional line
[that] invalidates the Corps’s assertion of jurisdiction over all waters except
for actually navigable waters, their tributaries, and wetlands adjacent
to each.”129
The dissent, applying Chevron, initially found that Congress had
not spoken clearly on the issue.130 Thus, under Step 2 of Chevron, the
dissent would have found the agencies’ interpretation reasonable.131 The
dissent chastised the majority for refusing to grant such deference to the
agency interpretation.132 In making this determination, the dissent placed
great weight on an asserted Congressional acquiescence to the Corps’s
1977 regulations, particularly on the Category 4 waters.133 The majority,
acknowledging occasional reliance on Congressional acquiescence, rejected the practice as “dangerous.”134

125

Id. at 167. Although Riverside Bayview Court failed to mention “nexus” at any point,
the Court in SWANCC presumably refers to Footnote 9 of the Riverside Bayview opinion,
where it details that “wetlands that are . . . significantly intertwined with the ecosystem
of adjacent waterways.” Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135, n.9.
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Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131, n.8.
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Id. at 191–93.
132
Id. at 191.
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The dissent would have also upheld the regulation under standard
commerce clause principles.135 Specifically, the landfill constitutes an activity that “substantially affects” interstate commerce, the third broad category of activity that Congress may regulate under the commerce power.136
D.

Tributary of a Tributary of a Tributary

Even before the SWANCC decision, the Corps of Engineers and
litigants had attempted to expand the meaning of waters of the United
States by showing adjacency of wetlands to a tributary of navigable waters.
After the decision in SWANCC foreclosed options to include isolated wetlands as WOTUS, adjacency became even more important. These efforts
focused on the seventh category of WOTUS: wetlands adjacent to other
waters of the United States.137 In particular, efforts focused on adjacency
to the sixth category of WOTUS: tributaries of navigable waters.138 The
focus on tributaries proves particularly interesting given the Corps failed
to define the term at that time, and neither the SWANCC nor the Riverside
Bayview opinion addressed the issue of tributaries at all.
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States139
recognized the trend with consternation.140 The Justice noted a U.S.
District Court case that distinguished SWANCC from the case before
them.141 Specifically, in contrast to the isolated waters in SWANCC,
“water molecules currently present in the wetlands will inevitably flow
towards and mix with water from connecting bodies,” and “[a] drop of rainwater landing in the Site is certain to intermingle with water from the
[nearby river].”142
These cases often involved a series of ditches, drains, and similar
types of conveyances. United States v. Eidson,143 although before SWANCC,
provides an example of the series of indirect pathways that courts relied
on to find jurisdiction to a tributary. In Eidson, a company disposed of a
“sludge substance” into a storm sewer that drained into a storm drainage
ditch, then a drainage canal, which empties Picnic Island Creek, a
135
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140
Id. at 728–29.
141
Id. at 724.
142
United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877–78 (N.D. Ind. 2002).
143
108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1997).
136

2021]

TURTLES ALL THE WAY DOWN

19

tributary of Tampa Bay.144 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found
that whether a conveyance is man-made or intermittent makes no difference under Section 404 of the CWA.145 The court also found that the
drainage ditch qualified as a tributary of Tampa Bay.146
The U.S. District Court for the District of Montana also addressed
this issue in a rehearing of the case after the SWANCC decision.147 The
case addressed whether wetlands adjacent to Fred Burr creek constituted
waters of the United States.
Fred Burr Creek wends its way through a small segment
of southwestern Montana. “Creek” is a seasonal misnomer;
during spring runoff, Fred Burr Creek thunders through
its broad valley at a deafening roar. The Creek is too wide
to jump across, up to 20 or 30 feet wide in some locations,
and approximately six inches to two or three feet deep,
depending on location and time of year. While its level of
flow varies, there is always water in the Creek.148
Fred Burr Creek is not navigable-in-fact due to frequent shallow
stretches and blockages by irrigation weirs, fences, and other obstructions.149 The sediments at issue in the case likely did not reach a navigable waterway.150 If not blocked by dams or obstructions, the sediments
may travel to the Pacific Ocean in a “decade.”151
The court acknowledged that Fred Burr Creek was a tributary of
a tributary of the Clark Fork River, a navigable-in-fact waterway.152 That
finding caused the court little pause, as the court noted that “case law
from the Circuit Courts of Appeals strongly suggests that tributaries
thrice-removed from navigable waters fall under federal jurisdiction.”153
More troubling was that the wetland abutting Fred Burr Creek lay
approximately 225 miles from the point where the Clark Fork becomes
navigable-in-fact.154 Most of the cases cited by the court did not address
144
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distance but appear to address “waters that are geographically relatively
near an indisputably navigable water.”155
Despite the great distance between the wetlands and a navigable
waterway, the court found, based on legislative history and prior case law,
that Congress intended to include Fred Burr Creek as a water of the United
States.156 Second, finding the Clark Fork to be a channel or potential
channel for interstate commerce, the court found that Congress did not
exceed its authority in including Fred Burr Creek as jurisdictional.157 The
court analogized Fred Burr Creek’s contribution to the waters of the
United States to the contributions of the wheat farmer in Wickard v.
Filburn158 to interstate commerce.159
E.

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006)

Five years after the SWANCC decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
revisited the meaning of waters of the United States.160 Riverside Bayview established that wetlands that abutted navigable waterways constituted waters of the United States.161 The Court in SWANCC drew a
boundary to jurisdiction, finding that isolated waters frequented by migratory birds did not constitute waters of the United States.162 In Rapanos,
the Court faced a case in the middle of these clear boundaries—wetlands
adjacent to a tributary of a tributary of a navigable water.163 The case
resulted in a fractured 4–4–1 opinion that continues to confound litigants
and their attorneys.164 Ultimately, it appears to have, arguably, generated more confusion than clarity.
1.

Facts and Procedural Posture

Rapanos involved two consolidated cases and four wetlands in
Michigan.165 Rapanos deposited fill into wetlands on three different
155
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sites.166 The wetlands at one site are connected to a man-made ditch,
which drains into a creek, then a river that drains into the Saginaw Bay
and Lake Huron.167 On another site, the wetlands connect to a drain that
has a surface connection to a river.168 At the third site, the wetlands
connect to a river that flows into Lake Huron.169 Whether the connections
are continuous or intermittent, or ditches and drains flow continuously
or occasionally was not clear from the record.170 The wetlands lay 11–20
miles from the navigable waters in question.171
In a civil enforcement action, the District Court found that the
three wetlands were “adjacent” to waters of the United States and, thus,
jurisdictional.172 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding
“hydrological connections between all three sites and the corresponding
adjacent tributaries of navigable waters.”173
In the other consolidated case, the Carabells were denied a permit
to fill a wetland about one mile from Lake St. Clair.174 A man-made drainage ditch lies along one side of the wetland, separated from the wetland
by a 4-foot-long impermeable, man-made berm.175 The ditch runs into
another ditch or drain, which connects to a creek that empties into Lake
St. Clair.176
After exhausting administrative appeals, the Carabells filed suit
in the District Court challenging the Corps’s jurisdiction over the site.177
The District Court found jurisdiction based on adjacency and “a significant nexus to ‘waters of the United States.’”178 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed upon a finding of adjacency.179
In essence, the Rapanos cases address the issue not directly addressed in Riverside Bayview—whether a wetland adjacent to a tributary
of a navigable water constitutes a water of the United States. Riverside
166
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Bayview’s wetland was adjacent to a navigable-in-fact water body, but the
holding included “wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their
tributaries.”180 But no tributaries were at issue in Riverside Bayview, and,
in fact, no regulatory definition of “tributary” existed at that point. The justices in Rapanos struggle to define “tributary” and “adjacent.”181 The term
“tributaries” had not been defined in the statute and regulations at the
time of the Riverside Bayview decision, nor before the Rapanos decision.182
In a now-infamous 4–1–4 decision, Justice Scalia writing for the
plurality, in which concurring Justice Kennedy joined with respect to the
holding, vacated the Sixth Circuit judgment and remanded the case further
proceedings.183 Justices Thomas and Alito, along with Chief Justice Roberts,
joined Justice Scalia’s opinion.184 Justice Stevens drafted the dissenting
opinion, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.185 Chief Justice
Roberts also filed a concurring opinion.186 Justice Breyer also wrote a
separate dissenting opinion.187
2.

Plurality Opinion

Justice Scalia’s opinion rails against the “U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (“Corps”) exercis[ing] the discretion of an enlightened despot”188 while overseeing an “immense expansion of federal regulation of
land use . . . under the CWA without any change in the governing statute.”189 The plurality opinion posited that a determination that a wetland
is covered by the CWA requires two findings. First, the adjacent waterway
must contain a “relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters.”190 Second, the wetland must have a continuous surface connection (abut) with that water.191 These two findings
harken back to Riverside Bayview’s holding that applies where the court
finds difficulty in determining where “‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’
180
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begins.”192 The first requirement goes to the breadth of the term tributary, while the second refers to the adjacency of a particular wetland. The
plurality, then, clarified the appropriate test to apply in this scenario.
a.

Tributaries

The plurality held that the meaning of “tributaries” within waters
of the United States includes “only those relatively permanent, standing
or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’ that
are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams,’ ‘oceans, rivers, [and]
lakes,’ . . . and does not include channels through which water flows
intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide
drainage or rainfall.”193 Justice Scalia presumably intends that waters
must meet this definition to qualify as a tributary to navigable waters.
Congress spoke clearly on the matter of “waters” and, applying Step 1 of
Chevron, “[t]he plain language of the statute simply does not authorize
this ‘Land Is Waters’ approach to federal jurisdiction.”194 Even further, the
plurality of four justices supported that notion that the plurality’s definition constitutes “the only plausible interpretation.”195 Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence noted this assertion and assumes that the plurality theory
forecloses any agency regulation to the contrary.196
The plurality, therefore, would require that the wetland abuts on
“relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water
‘forming geographic features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as
‘streams,’ ‘oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,’ to be considered jurisdictional.”197
This ruling falls short of requiring that a tributary be “navigable-in-fact.”198
The plurality also addressed the Corps’s interpretation of its regulations to include ephemeral streams and drainage ditches as tributaries
and, therefore, as waters of the United States.199 Further, Justice Scalia
noted that “man-made, intermittently flowing features, such as ‘drain tiles,
storm drains systems and culverts’ had been interpreted by the Corps as
tributaries.”200 According to the plurality, drain tiles, storm drain systems,
192
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and culverts constitute point sources, not waterways.201 The statute’s language indicates that “navigable waters” differ from a “point source” and
that a point source is therefore not a navigable water.202 Point sources
carry intermittent flows.203 Many of the conduits classified by the Corps
and lower courts as tributaries are actually point sources.204
The plurality excludes intermittent waters, ephemeral streams,
and “transitory puddles” from waters of the United States.205 Only “relatively permanent” waters qualify.206 The Corps’s interpretation would, the
plurality opined, interfere with the state’s authority to regulate water and
land use, turning the Corps into a federal zoning board.207 This stretching
of the limits of the commerce power urges a narrow interpretation of the
Corps’s authority.208
b.

Adjacency

After reviewing the history of the interpretation of “waters of the
United States” under the CWA, the plurality reviewed Riverside Bayview.209
Justice Scalia summarized that holding as deference to the Corps’s interpretation that “waters of United States” include wetlands that “‘actually abut[ted] on’ traditional navigable waters.”210 Riverside Bayview unambiguously
found that adjacent means “physically abutting,” not merely nearby.211
The plurality opinion referred to the Corps’s interpretation of “adjacency” that expanded upon the narrow holding of Riverside Bayview.212
These interpretations broaden the notion of adjacency to include wetlands
connected through “directional sheet flow during storm events,” lying
within the 100-year flood-plain or within 200 feet of a navigable waterway as “adjacent.”213 The plurality rejected this notion of converting the
abutment standard to one of a hydrologic connection, even insubstantial,
201
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as a “significant nexus.”214 The plurality continued, “Wetlands with only
an intermittent, physically remote hydrologic connection to ‘waters of the
United States’ . . . lack the necessary connection to covered waters that
[the Court] described as a ‘significant nexus’ in SWANCC.”215
Additionally, Justice Scalia set out, in the plurality’s view, the
correct standard to determine adjacency. To be adjacent, a wetland must
possess “a continuous surface connection that creates the boundarydrawing problem . . . addressed in Riverside Bayview.”216 When Justice
Scalia referred to “surface connection,” he presumably intended to articulate that the wetland extended to the boundary (abutted) of the navigable
water in Riverside Bayview.217 But Justice Scalia did not refer to, as some
commentators seem to infer, “surface water connection” with connection
to the definition of waters of the United States.218
Some courts and commentators have confused Justice Scalia’s
reference to a surface connection to mean that a continuous surface water
connection confers jurisdiction.219 That interpretation incorrectly applies
the plurality test. The context of the opinion, particularly the use of
“continuous surface connection” and abutment synonymously, indicates
that the plurality limited Riverside Bayview to its facts and require actual abutment.220
The plurality opinion clearly rejected the notion of hydrologic
connections equating to abutment, noting that such a test would make
wetlands connected via “the most insubstantial hydrologic connection”
may qualify as jurisdictional under such a test.221 Hydrologic connections
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fail to evoke the line-drawing problems that compelled deference in
Riverside Bayview.222 However, a surface connection constitutes abutment,
which may explain, in part, the confusion.
The use of the term “continuous” in connection with surface connection also creates confusion.223 If a surface hydrologic connection exists,
then the wetland abuts the surface water body. Perhaps the modifier
“continuous” reinforces the notion of a continuous flow of the water body,
but the opinion lacks clarity on that issue.224
Justice Scalia explained that deference to the agency under
Riverside Bayview arose, at least in part, from the difficulty in drawing
the line between where land ends and water begins.225 The late Justice
further noted that Riverside Bayview presented that case with an abutting wetland.226 No such difficulty exists concerning “isolated” wetlands.227
Therefore, the plurality held that only adjacent wetlands are jurisdictional.228 Riverside Bayview stands for the principle that abutment, and
only abutment, provides the “significant nexus” referred to in SWANCC
between wetlands and navigable waters.
Contrary to Justice Kennedy’s formulation, the plurality understands that abutment and significant nexus as used by the Court in
SWANCC are synonymous. Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test is
therefore misplaced, as the significant nexus test adds an extra requirement to certain types of wetlands that abut tributaries.229 The plurality
bemoaned the lack of clear definitions for tributary and adjacent.230 Where
the wetlands abut navigable waters, the wetlands become indistinguishable from the waters of the United States.231
From the plurality opinion:
Therefore, only those wetlands with a continuous surface
connection to bodies that are “waters of the United States”
222
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in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation
between “waters” and wetlands, are “adjacent to” such waters and covered by the Act. Wetlands with only an intermittent, physically remote hydrologic connection to “waters
of the United States” do not implicate the boundary-drawing
problem of Riverside Bayview, and thus lack the necessary
connection to covered waters that we described as a “significant nexus” in SWANCC. Thus, establishing that wetlands such as those at the Rapanos and Carabell sites are
covered by the Act requires two findings: first, that the
adjacent channel contains a “wate[r] of the United States,”
(i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to
traditional interstate navigable waters); and second, that
the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that
water, making it difficult to determine where the “water”
ends and the “wetland” begins.232
3.

Concurring Opinion (Kennedy)

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence sets out the test that is most often
used after Rapanos, which has also generated the most uncertainty.233
The “significant nexus” test (drawn from the first use of the phrase in
SWANCC) grants the Corps jurisdiction over “adjacent wetlands”234 where
a significant nexus exists between the wetlands and “navigable waters
in a traditional sense.”235
The term “significant nexus” is used only once in SWANNC.236
Even then, the term merely referred to the holding in Riverside Bayview,
an opinion that does not mention the term at all.237 Neither the statute
nor any regulations promulgated to the point of the Rapanos opinion
232

Id. at 742 (internal citations omitted).
See generally Precon Dev. Corp. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278,
281 (4th. Cir. 2010); Sackett v. United States EPA, No. 19-35469, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS
24329, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2021); Lewis v. United States Army Corp of Eng’rs, No. 18-1838
SECTION: “S” (1), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149115, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2020).
234
Whether the Kennedy test includes “waters” adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters is unclear. Justice Kennedy referred only to wetlands. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759–87 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
235
Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
236
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs,
531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001).
237
See generally United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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mentioned significant nexus. The dissenting opinion notes this anomaly,238
as well as the plurality, meaning that 8 of 9 justices did not support the
significant nexus test. The plurality characterizes the Kennedy test as
“devis[ing] his new statute all on his own.”239
Justice Kennedy characterizes the holding in SWANCC as a
finding that the substantial nexus that controlled in Riverside Bayview
was lacking with respect to the isolated pits in SWANNC.240 However,
the majority opinion in SWANCC never applied any significant nexus
analysis, instead finding that Congress had clearly spoken to the issue
of isolated waters.
Justice Kennedy found that a significant nexus automatically exists
when a wetland is adjacent to a navigable-in-fact water body.241 Wetlands
adjacent to waters not navigable-in-fact242 possess this nexus where the
wetlands, “either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in
the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”243
The plurality opinion characterized Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as
seizing upon a term that appears nowhere in the CWA, but arose from
a single U.S. Supreme Court case.244 However, similar to the plurality,
Justice Kennedy opined that a “mere hydrologic connection” fails to
equate to a significant nexus “in all cases.”245
Justice Kennedy finds that the Corps’s definition of “adjacent” is
reasonable and entitled to deference.246 Added to the four dissenting
justices, who would also defer, a majority of the Court found the definition of adjacent a reasonable one.
Justice Kennedy also appears to find that the Corps’s standard for
jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands is based upon a reasonable interpretation of the statute under the Chevron test.247 However, the concurrence
reasoned that the Corps’s interpretation of “tributary” is too broad and
interpreting the statute in this way is not reasonable.248 Therefore, a
238

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 807 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 756.
240
Id. at 766–67, 774.
241
See id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
242
Presumably this water must also be a tributary.
243
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244
Id. at 753.
245
Id. at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
246
Id. at 775.
247
Id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (applying the reasoning of Riverside Bayview).
248
See id. at 780–82.
239
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case-by-case analysis is necessary for making jurisdictional determinations for wetlands adjacent to waters not navigable-in-fact.249
Therefore, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence interprets jurisdiction
much more expansively than the plurality, yet more narrowly in some
respects. Under the Kennedy test, a significant nexus per se (and hence
jurisdiction) exists between a wetland and an adjacent navigable-in-fact
water.250 In contrast, under the plurality test, the adjacent waterway
need not be navigable-in-fact to be jurisdictional, so long as the adjacent
water is continuous and relatively permanent.251 However, the plurality
believes that jurisdiction stops at adjacency to a continuous and relatively permanent water.252 Under the significant nexus test propounded
by Justice Kennedy, an intermittent or ephemeral stream may be jurisdictional, depending on the particular facts.253 For example, assume a
wetland adjacent to a continuous and relatively permanent tributary
that is not navigable-in-fact. The plurality would find this to be jurisdictional, while Kennedy would only do so if a significant nexus is present.
Justice Kennedy also claims that the significant nexus test is “the most
reasonable interpretation,” again raising doubts as to whether an agency
interpretation otherwise would be worthy of deference.254
Justice Kennedy appears to misinterpret the plurality when he
states that “when a surface-water connection is lacking, the plurality forecloses jurisdiction over wetlands that abut navigable-in-fact waters—
even though such navigable waters were traditionally subject to federal
authority.”255 The plurality opinion states that if a “surface connection”
exists with navigable water, the wetland is jurisdictional.256
Justice Scalia used “surface connection” interchangeably with
“abuts.” So, Justice Scalia (the plurality rule) states that if the wetland
abuts certain waterways, the wetland is jurisdictional.257 Justice Scalia
never uses the term “surface-water connection” except in referring to the
lower court opinions. If some hydrologic connection exists, but there is no
physical abutment, Justice Scalia would appear to believe jurisdiction is

249

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 782.
Id. at 767, 772.
251
Id. at 716, 726.
252
Id. at 732.
253
Id. at 767, 776, 782, 787.
254
Id. at 756–57.
255
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 776.
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Id. at 757.
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Id. at 717, 725, 735, 740.
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lacking.258 Justice Kennedy uses “surface-water connection” and “surface
connection” interchangeably. Scalia uses “surface connection” and “abut”
interchangeably. Clearly, a disconnect exists.
For example, Justice Kennedy refutes the plurality’s finding that
a continuous surface connection is required, in part, by using the flooding
context.259 In a flood, the surface water comes into contact with the wetlands only intermittently.260 However, that analysis is irrelevant to the
plurality’s rule, which examines abutment, not the source of water for
the wetland. The relevance of the source of the wetland characteristics
was rejected in Riverside Bayview.261
More directly, Justice Kennedy incorrectly concludes that where
a surface-water connection is lacking, but abutment exists, the plurality
would find no jurisdiction.262 This analysis misinterprets the plurality’s
decision. The concurring opinion also presumes that the plurality would
find jurisdiction where a surface water connection exists, but the wetland
does not abut the waterway.263 On the contrary, the plurality would find
no jurisdiction where a surface water connection exists, but the wetland
fails to abut the navigable waterway.
However, Justice Kennedy would not defer to the Corps’s existing
“standard” for tributaries.264 The Corps “deems a water a tributary if it
feeds into a traditional navigable water (or a tributary thereof) and possesses an ordinary high-water mark. . . .”265 This standard is overbroad,
allowing for “regulation of drains, ditches and streams remote from any
navigable-in-fact water.”266 The concurring opinion concludes that adjacency to navigable-in-fact waters provides a sufficient nexus for regulation, but a significant nexus must be established on a case-by-case basis
for wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries.267
4.

Dissenting Opinion

The dissenting opinion criticizes both the plurality and the Kennedy
concurrence for failing to grant sufficient deference to the agency, given
258

Id. at 742.
Id. at 773–74.
260
Id. (emphasis added).
261
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129–30 (1985).
262
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 776 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
263
Id.
264
Id. at 780–81.
265
Id. at 781.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the “technical and complex character of the issues at stake” and the “nature
of the congressional delegation to the agency.”268 Justice Stevens applies
Step 2 of Chevron and finds that the Corps’s interpretation is a reasonable
one.269 Justice Stevens finds the analysis “straightforward”—the Corps
“has determined that wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally
navigable water preserve the quality of our Nation’s waters . . . ,” a
“quintessential example of the Executive’s reasonable interpretation of a
statutory provision.”270 The plurality and Kennedy decisions amounted
to a “judicial amendment of the CWA.”271
The plurality opinion describes the dissent as finding that “‘the
waters of the United States’ include any wetlands ‘adjacent’ (no matter
how broadly defined) to ‘tributaries’ (again, no matter how broadly defined) of traditional navigable waters.”272 Meanwhile, Justice Kennedy
objects to the dissent reading the term “navigable waters” entirely out of
the CWA and giving too much deference to the Corps.273
Acknowledging that Riverside Bayview involved a wetland that
abutted a navigable waterway, the dissent nonetheless asserts that the
Court deferred to the Corps’s definition of adjacent, which included wetlands in “reasonable proximity” to navigable waters and wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters.274 Therefore, Riverside Bayview
controls according to the dissent, even though no tributary was involved.275
The dissent opined that the plurality’s reliance on SWANCC was
misplaced, as SWANCC involved “waters,” not “wetlands.”276 The dissent
considers Rapanos and Riverside Bayview as equivalent cases—wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters or tributaries of navigable waters.277 Left
unaddressed by the dissent is whether the Corps’s interpretation of the
undefined term tributary is worthy of deference.

268

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 787–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 788.
270
Id.
271
Id. One may reasonably question whether the U.S. Supreme Court holds the authority
to, instead of merely remanding the case to the agency, essentially engage in rule-making
and promulgate its own definition of waters of the United States. The plurality and Kennedy
decisions may more accurately be described as amending the regulations that implement
the Clean Water Act.
272
Id. at 746.
273
Id. at 778–79.
274
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 792–93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 792.
276
Id. at 794.
277
Id. at 796.
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The dissent also misinterprets the plurality test. The plurality
would allow, according to the dissent, a developer to fill a wetland that
“border[s] traditionally navigable waters or their tributaries” that “perform the essential function of soaking up overflow waters during hurricane season” because the “wetlands lack a surface connection with the
adjacent waterway the rest of the year.”278 This interpretation conflicts with
the clear language of the plurality that a wetland that abuts relatively
permanent water that connects to traditional navigable waters constitutes
waters of the United States.279 Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test
similarly draws the ire of the dissent as constituting a “judicially crafted
rule distilled from” the passing use of the term “significant nexus” in the
SWANCC case.280
The dissent also uses dictionary references to assert that “adjacent” includes more than just wetlands that abut a waterway.281 More
importantly, the dissent argues, the question is whether the Corps’s definition of adjacent is reasonable, not whether the plurality would define
the term differently.282 Finally, the dissent notes that since the four dissenters would find that wetlands defined as waters of the United States
under either the plurality test or the Kennedy test are indeed waters of
the United States, lower courts should similarly find that wetlands qualify
if meeting either test.283
5.

Other Opinions

Justice Breyer’s separate dissent asserts that Congress intended
to invoke the Commerce Clause’s full extent when enacting the CWA.284
The Court improperly adds a “significant nexus” requirement into the
statute.285 Congress intended that the Court defer to the agency’s expertise, so the agency should immediately craft new regulations.286
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurring opinion, mainly
to chide the Corps for failing to enact rules to clarify the meaning of
278

Id. at 805.
Id. at 742.
280
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 805.
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Id. at 805–06.
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Id. at 810.
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Id. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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WOTUS.287 The Chief Justice noted that the Court rejected the Corps’s
position that its authority was “essentially limitless” in this respect in
SWANCC.288 Such rules, conceded Roberts, would be subject to Chevron
deference.289 Although the Corps and EPA initiated a rule-making, the
“proposed rulemaking went nowhere.”290 Chief Justice Roberts bemoans
how easily the fractured opinion in Rapanos could have been avoided by
rule-making.291
III.

POST RAPANOS RULE-MAKING

In the absence of a statutory definition of “waters of the United
States,” in light of the decades of legal debate over the meaning of this
term, and perhaps in response to the chiding of Chief Justice Roberts in
his Rapanos concurrence, the EPA set out to promulgate a rule defining
“waters of the United States.”292 Far from ending the controversy surrounding the meaning of waters of the United States, the confusion and
debates have only increased.293
A.

Obama Administration WOTUS Rule

The Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers issued a proposed definition of WOTUS in 2014.294 Numerous
stakeholder groups had requested this action as well.295 The agencies
received over one million comments on the proposed rule and published the
final rule in June 2015, which would go into effect on August 28, 2015.296
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Id. at 757–58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 757.
289
Id. at 758.
290
Id. at 758.
291
Id.
292
See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 22,188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014).
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Richard M. Glick & Oliver F. Jamin, ‘Waters of the United States’: Nearly 50 Years of
Jurisdictional Uncertainty, and More to Come, 26 J. WATER L. 147, 150–51 (2020).
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See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 22,188.
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See EPA WEB ARCHIVE, Persons and Organizations Requesting Clarification of “Waters
of the United States” by Rulemaking, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files
/2014-03/documents/wus_request_rulemaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ3G-Q4JS].
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See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States” Final Rule 80 Fed
Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015).
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For purposes of clarity, we will refer to this as the “Obama Rule” or the
“WOTUS Rule.”
1.

The Text of the WOTUS Rule

The agencies attempted to interpret the scope of WOTUS “using
the goals, objectives and policies of the statute, the Supreme Court case
law, the relevant and available science, and the agencies’ technical
expertise and experience as support.”297 In particular, the rule cites the
“significant nexus standard” as “an important element of the agencies’
interpretation” of the CWA.298 This rule essentially provides seven categories of jurisdictional waters.
a.

Categorically Jurisdictional Waters

First, certain waters are categorically jurisdictional: traditional
navigable waters, interstate waters, including interstate wetlands, the
territorial seas, and impoundments of waters identified as WOTUS.299
The definitions of these three categories did not change from the prior
regulations/interpretations of the WOTUS Rule.300 Traditional navigable
waters, the territorial seas, impoundments of waters identified as a
WOTUS have not been subject to much of the controversy surrounding
the WOTUS Rule.301 Interstate waters, however, were not included in the
Trump definition, creating a significant difference as discussed below.302
b.

Definitionally Jurisdictional Waters

Second, the rule designates two categories of waters as jurisdictional if the waters meet the definitions included in the WOTUS Rule.303
Much of the controversy and legal debate surrounding the WOTUS Rule
focuses on these definitions of tributaries and adjacent waters.304
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Id.
Id.
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See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)–(4) (2020).
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33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)–(2), (4), (6) (2015).
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Staff Report, Federal Judge Vacates Trump-Era WOTUS Rule Replacement, COASTALRE
VIEW.ORG (Aug. 31, 2021), https://coastalreview.org/2021/08/federal-judge-vacates-trump
-era-wotus-rule-replacement/ [https://perma.cc/HK7J-Y9YT].
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Tributaries

The Obama Rule defined tributaries for the first time under the
CWA and provided that all tributaries of traditional navigable waters,
interstate waters, and the territorial seas are considered a WOTUS.305
Tributaries are defined as “water that contributes flow, either directly or
through another water,” to a traditional navigable water, interstate water,
or territorial sea “that is characterized by the presence of the physical indicators of a bed and banks and ordinary high water mark.”306 Tributaries
can be naturally occurring, man-made, or man-altered and “include[]
waters such as rivers, streams canals, and ditches not [otherwise] excluded”
by the Obama Rule.307
2)

Adjacent Waters

The Obama Rule also provides that “all waters adjacent” to traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, the territorial seas, impoundments of a WOTUS, and tributaries, including wetlands,308 ponds, lakes,
oxbows, impoundments, and similar waters, are jurisdictional.309
Two additional definitions prove critical to understanding the
meaning of adjacent waters under this Rule. First, adjacent under the
regulations, “means bordering, contiguous, or neighboring” and includes
“waters separated by [] dikes or barriers, natural river berms, [and]
beach dunes . . . .”310 Second, the Obama Rule defines neighboring waters
as “all waters located within 100 feet of the ordinary high water mark” of
traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, the territorial seas, impoundments of a WOTUS, and tributaries; “all waters located within the
100-year floodplain” of traditional navigable waters, interstate waters,
the territorial seas, impoundments of a WOTUS, and tributaries; and “all
waters located within 1,500 feet of the high tide line”311 of a traditional
305

See 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a)(1)–(3), (c)(3) (2015).
Id. §§ 328.3(c)(3).
307
Id.
308
Wetlands are defined as “those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or
groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances do support a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted or life in saturated
soil conditions” including “swamps, marshes, bogs, and similarly areas.” Id. § 328.3(b),
(a)(1)–(6).
309
See id. § 328.3(a)(1)–(6).
310
Id. § 328.3(c)(1).
311
The “high tide line” is the “intersection of the land with the water’s surface at the maximum height reached by a rising tide.” 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a)(1)–(5), (c)(2)(i)–(iii).
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navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas.312 If any portion
of a water body is located within these bounds, the entire water is considered neighboring.313
With regard to open waters such as ponds or lakes, the adjacent
waters include any wetlands within or abutting the ordinary high-water
mark.314 Adjacent waters include all waters that connect segments of traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, the territorial seas, impoundments of a WOTUS, and tributaries.315
The WOTUS Rule expressly excludes “[w]aters being used for
established normal farming, ranching, and silviculture activities,” from the
“adjacent” definition, citing to the Section 404 exception defining normal
farming, silviculture, and ranching activities “such as plowing, seeding,
cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber,
and forest products, or upland soil and water conservation practices.”316
c.

Case-by-Case Evaluation

“Certain waters would be subject to a case-by-case, factual evaluation of whether nor not they are a WOTUS based on the existence of a
significant nexus to a jurisdictional water.”317 The waters included within
the WOTUS rule’s significant nexus test include a much wider range of
waters than intended by Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion.318 Justice
Kennedy applied the significant nexus only to adjacent wetlands.319
The WOTUS Rule defines “significant nexus” as “a water, including wetlands, either alone or in combination with other similarly situated
waters in the region, significantly affects the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of” traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, or
territorial seas.320 The effect must be more than speculative or insubstantial.321 The Obama Rule lists several functions relevant to analyzing
312

Id. § 328.3(a)(1)–(3).
Id. § 328.3(c)(2)(i)–(iii).
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Id. § 328.3(c)(1).
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significant nexus, including “sediment trapping; nutrient recycling; pollutant trapping, transformation, filtering, and transport; retention and
attenuation of floodwaters; runoff storage; contribution of flow; export of
organic matter; export of food resources, and; provision of life cycle
dependent aquatic habitat.”322
1)

Regional Water Features with a Significant Nexus

Certain regional water features are jurisdictional if the features
possess a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters, interstate
waters, or the territorial seas.323 For purposes of the significant nexus
analysis, all waters “similarly situated” within the “watershed that drains”
into the jurisdictional water will be aggregated.324 The waters included
under this category are:
(i) prairie potholes (a complex of glacially formed wetlands,
usually occurring in depressions that lack permanent natural outlets, located in the upper Midwest); (ii) Carolina and
Delmarva bays (ponded, depressional wetlands that occur
along the Atlantic coastal plain); (iii) Pocosins (evergreen
shrub and tree dominated wetlands found predominantly
along the Central Atlantic Coastal plain); (iv) Western
vernal pools (seasonal wetlands located in parts of California and associated with topographic depression, soils with
poor drainage, mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers);
and (v) Texas coastal prairie wetlands (freshwater wetlands that occur as a mosaic of depressions, ridges, intermound flats, and mima mound wetlands located along the
Texas Gulf Coast).325
The analysis of whether a feature listed in this category has a “significant nexus” to waters used or susceptible to use in interstate commerce,
interstate waters, or the territorial seas is to be conducted on a case-bycase basis.326
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Proximity to Flood-Plain or High Tide Line with a Significant
Nexus

The Obama Rule includes as jurisdictional all waters that are
determined on a case-specific basis to have a significant nexus to a
traditional navigable water, interstate water, or territorial sea and are
either (1) “located within the 100-year floodplain” of a traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, or territorial sea or (2) “within 4,000 feet
of the high tide line or ordinary high water mark” of a traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, territorial sea, impoundment of jurisdictional water, or tributary.327 Any water determined to have a significant
nexus that is only partially within the flood-plain or within 4,000 feet of
the high tide line or ordinary high-water mark shall be entirely deemed
a WOTUS.328
d.

Categorical Exclusions

The Obama Rule lists numerous waters that are categorically
excluded from the definition of WOTUS, even if the waters meet the
terms of the definitions in the Rule.329 These include:
•
•
•
•

•

•
•

327

Waste treatment systems;
Prior converted cropland;
Ditches with ephemeral flow that are not a relocated tributary or excavated in a tributary;
Ditches with intermittent flow that are not a relocated tributary, excavated in a tributary, or drain
wetlands;
Ditches that do not flow either directly or through
another water into traditional navigable waters,
interstate waters, or territorial sea;
Artificially irrigated areas that would revert to dry
land should application of water to that area cease;
Artificial, constructed lakes and ponds created in
dry land such as farm and stock watering ponds,
irrigation ponds, settling basins, fields flooded for
rice growing, log cleaning ponds, or cooling ponds;

See id. § 328.3(a)(8).
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•
•

•
•
•

•
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Artificial reflecting pools or swimming pools on dry
land;
Small ornamental waters created on dry land;
Water-filled depressions created in dry land incidental to mining or construction;
Erosional features such as gullies, rills, or other
ephemeral features that do not meet the definition
of a tributary, non-wetland swale, and lawfully constructed grassed waterways;
Puddles;
Groundwater (including groundwater drained
through subsurface drainage systems);
Stormwater control features constructed to convey,
treat, or store stormwater that are created in dry
land; and
Wastewater recycling structures constructed on dry
land, groundwater recharge basins, percolation
ponds built for wastewater recycling, and water distributary structures built for wastewater recycling.330

Litigation

A flurry of litigation challenged both the Obama Rule itself and
the Trump Administration’s later procedural approach to repeal and revise
the Rule.
a.

Challenges to Obama Rule

Upon publication of the Obama Rule, lawsuits were filed across
the country by thirty-one states and fifty-three non-state parties, including environmental groups and industry groups representing agriculture,
forestry, and recreational interests.331 These cases were filed in both federal district courts and federal courts of appeal across the country.332 Numerous court decisions related to the Obama Rule have been issued.333 The
330
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myriad of decisions, including numerous injunctions being issued, resulted
in a patchwork of the WOTUS Rule’s applicability.334 Prior to its repeal in
December 2019, the WOTUS Rule formed the default rule, binding unless
legal action prevented the rule’s applicability in a jurisdiction.335 At that
time, judicial action blocked the rule in twenty-seven states: Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Indiana, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,336 North Dakota, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.337 In these
states, the pre–Obama Rule case law and regulatory structure discussed

of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 804, 808–09 (6th Cir. 2015) (issuing nationwide stay of Obama Rule);
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. United States Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 621 (2017) (holding
proper venue for legal challenges to WOTUS definition is district court and not direct
review in Circuit Courts of Appeals); Murray Energy Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Def.,
713 Fed. App. 489, 490–91 (6th Cir. 2018) (lifting nationwide stay of Obama Rule in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.); Georgia v. Pruitt, No. 15-cv-79,
slip op. at 10 (S.D. Ga. June 8, 2018) (issuing eleven-state injunction); Texas v. United
States EPA, No. 3:15-cv-162, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160443, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12,
2018) (enjoining the rule in three states); Texas v. United States EPA, No. 3:15-cv-00162,
Memorandum Opinion and Order (S.D. Tex. May 28, 2019) (holding EPA violated APA
in passing final Obama Rule based upon significant differences between proposed and
final rules); Oklahoma ex rel. Hunter v. United States EPA, No. 15-CV-0381-CVE-FHM,
Opinion and Order (May 29, 2019) (denying motion for preliminary injunction to prevent
enforcement of Obama Rule in Oklahoma upon finding no proof of irreparable harm).
334
EPA, U.S. ARMY REPEAL 2015 RULE DEFINING “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES”
ENDING REGULATORY PATCHWORK, EPA (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases
/epa-us-army-repeal-2015-rule-defining-waters-united-states-ending-regulatory-patchwork
[https://perma.cc/FN77-8GQR].
335
About Waters of the United States, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/wotus/about-waters-united
-states#history [https://perma.cc/8XAZ-GTP8] (last updated Sept. 3, 2021).
336
Initially, New Mexico was part of the thirteen-state injunction issued by the North
Dakota federal court. In March 2019, New Mexico filed a motion to leave the case, which
was granted by the court. In granting that motion, the court stated the injunction would
be lifted, but said that it would remain in effect as to Intervenor-Plaintiff Coalition of
Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable Economic Growth, which represents New
Mexicans across the state. Both attorneys for the Coalition and New Mexico state officials
have said they believe the court’s order preserves the injunction in New Mexico, meaning
the Obama Rule does not apply at this time. See Ellen M. Gilmer & Ariel Wittenberg,
Court Sides with WOTUS Foes as Legal Fight Gets Messier, E&E NEWS (May 29, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060425141 [https://perma.cc/6BDD-8CYG].
337
See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4162
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328); North Dakota v. United States
EPA, 127 F. Supp. 1047 (D.N.D. 2015); Georgia v. Pruitt, No. 15-cv-79, slip op. at 10 (S.D.
Ga. June 8, 2018); Texas v. United States EPA, No. 3:15-cv-162, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
160443, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2018).
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in supra Part III remained the applicable law.338 For the remaining twentythree states, the WOTUS Rule was in place: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and
Washington.339
The legal challenges to the Rule were similar in many of the cases.
Plaintiffs primarily alleged that the EPA violated its authority under the
CWA and violated the Administrative Procedures Act in promulgating
the WOTUS Rule.340 In Georgia v. Wheeler, the court held that the new
WOTUS definition violated the EPA’s authority pursuant to the CWA
with regard to several elements of the definition.341
First, the court found the WOTUS Rule’s inclusion of “interstate
waters, including interstate wetlands” to be overly broad as “read[ing]
navigability out of the CWA.”342 The Court noted that interstate waters
could include isolated ponds like those in SWANCC and even those
isolated waters with no significant nexus to jurisdictional waters.343 This
result was particularly problematic given the definitions of adjacent and
tributary, which could extend jurisdiction beyond even the isolated pond
to those waters within 4,000 feet of said interstate water.344 Thus, this
portion of the rule exceeded the EPA’s authority under the CWA.345
Second, the court found the Rule’s definition of tributaries similarly overreached.346 The possibility of determining the presence of a bed
and banks and an ordinary high-water mark of tributaries using mapping technology, historical data, and computer-based modeling, even if
not physically present, proved particularly troubling to the court.347 The
court reasoned that the rule strayed too far from Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test as there need not actually be sufficient volume and
338

Brent Carson et al., Federal Judge Limits the Reach of the WOTUS Rule, NAT’L L. REV.
(Sept. 5, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/federal-judge-limits-reach-wotus
-rule [https://perma.cc/VG39-8TNP].
339
See id.
340
See, e.g., Georgia v. Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1343 (S.D. Ga. 2019).
341
Id. at 1344.
342
Id. at 1358.
343
Id. at 1359.
344
Id.
345
Id. at 1360.
346
Note that the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota reached a similar conclusion with regard to the “tributary” definition when analyzing the plaintiffs’ likelihood
of success on the merits on a motion for injunction. Compare Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d at
1361 with North Dakota v. United States EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1055–56 (D.N.D. 2015).
347
Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1361.
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flow physically present in an area so long as computer programs can
determine they have been there sometime in the past.348 An additional
concern was expressed with regard to the West, where physical features
like an ordinary high-water mark could be “randomly and inconsistently
distributed throughout the landscape.”349 Again, the Court held the
definition too broad for the authority granted by the CWA.350
Third, the Court held that the definition of adjacent waters included no significant nexus requirement and, instead, relied upon the
distance from a flood-plain, ordinary high-water mark, or high tide line also
violated the CWA.351 The Court noted, “selecting a 100-year floodplain on
this basis may well be practical and convenient, but it does not show how
or why the waters within that floodplain, as opposed to a different floodplain, have a significant nexus to navigable waters.”352
Next, the Court turned to the WOTUS Rule’s case-by-case approach
concerning certain physical features like prairie potholes.353 Because
jurisdiction for these features would require proof of significant nexus to
a jurisdictional water, the Court found this category to be within the
CWA’s scope.354
Finally, concerning the Administrative Procedures Act challenge,
the court held that many of the provisions in the final rule were not a
“logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule, including the distance limits for
adjacent and case-by-case waters and the existence of a farming exception for adjacent waters but not for tributaries.355 The Court compared
the text of the proposed rule and the final rule and agreed that no logical
outgrowth existed from the proposed rule.356 Further, the interested
parties were prevented from making substantive comments on the final
rule due to this issue, which all violated the Administrative Procedures
Act.357 The Court also found the WOTUS Rule arbitrary and capricious

348

Id.
Id. at 1362.
350
Id. at 1362–63.
351
Id. at 1363.
352
Id. at 1366.
353
Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1367–68, 1368 n.8.
354
Id. at 1369.
355
Id. at 1372.
356
Georgia v. Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1376–78 (S.D. Ga. 2019), appeal dismissed
sub nom., Georgia Ex. Rel. Carr v. McCarthy, 19-14237-CC, 2019 WL 7761571 (11th Cir.
Dec. 26, 2019), and reconsideration denied, 2:15-CV-00079, 2020 WL 6948800 (S.D. Ga.
Jan. 3, 2020).
357
See also Texas v. United States EPA, 389 F. Supp. 3d 497, 504, 506 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (holding final rule’s definition of adjacent waters as compared to the proposed rule definition
349
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regarding the farming exception applying to adjacent waters and not
tributaries, the use of the 100-year flood-plain to identify case by case
and adjacent waters, and the 1,500-foot limit for adjacent waters.358
While the National Wildlife Federation and One Hundred Miles initially appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, the parties voluntarily dismissed that lawsuit in December 2019.359
b.

Challenges to Rescind/Revise Rule

Another line of litigation related to the WOTUS Rule arose in
2018 when the Trump EPA issued a final rule setting the applicability date
of the Obama Rule as February 6, 2020.360 The result of this final rule
would have been to delay the implementation of the Obama Rule.361 During
that time, the Trump administration would propose its own version of a
definition.362 This final rule delaying the application was challenged in
several district courts by various states and environmental groups.363
Two federal courts ruled in favor of the challengers and vacated the final
rule delaying the WOTUS Rule’s applicability.364 The Trump EPA chose
not to challenge these rulings, instead focusing on the new proposed
Navigable Waters Protection Rule definition discussed in Part V below.365
deprived “Plaintiffs of a meaningful opportunity to comment and possibly deconstruct the
Final Connectively Report” thereby violating the APA); North Dakota v. United States
EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1051 (D.N.D. 2015) (plaintiffs likely to succeed on merits of
same claim).
358
See also North Dakota v. United States EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d at 1057 (noting Plaintiffs
were likely to succeed on the merits because the 4,000-foot standard from a high-water
mark is arbitrary and capricious).
359
Georgia ex. rel. Carr v. McCarthy, No. 19-14237-CC, 2019 WL 7761571, at *1 (11th Cir.
Dec. 26, 2019).
360
See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200 (Feb. 6, 2018).
361
Rachel Neumann, Is the Trump Administration’s New WOTUS Definition a Restoration
of Federalism or a Retreat from Principles of Environmental Protection?, 22 DENV. WATER
L. REV. 703, 705, 707, 713 (2019).
362
Id. at 705.
363
Jacob Aronson & Marc Bruner, EPA Delays Applicability of Clean Water Rule While
Challenges to Rule Proceed in District Courts, PERKINS COIE, CAL. LAND USE & DEV. L.
REP. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.californialandusedevelopmentlaw.com/2018/04/04/epa
-delays-applicability-of-clean-water-rule-while-challenges-to-rule-proceed-in-district-courts/
[https://perma.cc/G7RL-MJRC].
364
See South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 962–63
(D.S.C. 2018); Puget Soundkeeper All. v. Wheeler, No. C15-1342-JCC, 2018 WL 6169196,
at *7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2018).
365
See Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017).
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B.

Trump Administration Navigable Waters Protection Rule

Within one month after his inauguration, President Trump issued
an Executive Order requiring the EPA and Corps of Engineers to either
rescind or revise the WOTUS rule and to consider interpreting the term
waters of the United States in a manner consistent with Justice Scalia’s
plurality opinion in Rapanos.366
In July 2017, as part of a two-step process, the EPA published a
proposed rule referred to as the “step-one rule” to rescind the Obama Rule
and essentially recodify the regulatory definition of WOTUS that existed
before the Obama Rule’s enactment.367 A year later, on July 12, 2018, the
agencies published a supplemental notice of public rule-making to clarify,
supplement, and seek additional comment on the Step One notice of proposed rule-making.368 A final “step-one rule,” known as the Repeal Rule,
was effective on December 23, 2019.369 This rule “implemented the pre2015 Rule regulations informed by applicable agency guidance documents and consistent with Supreme Court decisions and longstanding
agency practice.”370 Although several lawsuits challenged the Repeal
Rule, no rulings have been issued in such lawsuits, leaving the Repeal Rule
in effect nationwide.371
On December 11, 2018, the EPA and Corps of Engineers issued
a proposed their “step-two” rule to revise the definition of WOTUS.372
Public comment was allowed from February 14, 2019, through April 15,
2019.373 The final rule, termed the Navigable Waters Protection Rule,
was released in January 2020 and became effective on June 22, 2020.374
366

Id.
See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules,
82 Fed. Reg. 34,899, 34,900 (proposed July 27, 2017). See also discussion supra Part II.
368
See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule,
83 Fed. Reg. 32,227, 32,230–31 (July 12, 2018).
369
Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 84
Fed. Reg. 56,626 (proposed Oct. 22, 2019).
370
Id. at 56,661.
371
See California v. Wheeler, 467 F. Supp. 3d 864, 870 (N.D. Cal. 2020); see, e.g., Pascua
Yaqui Tribe v. United States EPA, CV-20-00266-TUC-RM, 2021 WL 3855977, at *1 (D.
Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021); Puget Soundkeeper All. v. Wheeler, C20-0950-JCC, 2020 WL 5095
463, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 2020).
372
See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154 (proposed
Feb. 14, 2019) (the “Trump Rule”).
373
Id.
374
The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 85
367
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The Text of the Navigable Waters Protection Rule (“NWPR”)

The final NWPR essentially includes three sections: (1) Jurisdictional waters; (2) Non-jurisdictional waters; and (3) Definitions.375
a.

Jurisdictional Waters
The NWPR defines waters of the United States as:
(i)

(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

The territorial seas, and waters currently used, previously used, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including waters subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide;376
Tributaries;
Lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional
waters;377 and
Adjacent wetlands.378

As with the Obama Rule, the definitions of tributary and adjacent
wetlands are critical to understanding the scope of the Trump waters of
the United States definition.
The Trump Rule defines a tributary as “a river, stream, or similar
naturally occurring surface water channel that contributes surface water
Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3); Proposed Revised
Definition of WOTUS—Public Hearing, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/wotus/proposed-revised
-definition-wotus-public-hearing [https://perma.cc/T2QU-4GB5] (last updated May 14, 2021).
375
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)–(c) (2020).
376
“Those waters that rise and fall in a predictable and measurable rhythm or cycle due to
the gravitational pulls of the moon and sun.” Id. § 328.3(a); These waters end where “the
rise and fall of the water surface can no longer be practically measured in a predictable
rhythm due to masking by hydrologic, wind, or other effects.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(11).
377
Defined as standing bodies of open water that contribute surface flow to a jurisdictional
water identified in category 1(i) in a typical year either directly or through a tributary; lake,
pond, or impoundment of jurisdictional water; or adjacent wetland. Id. §§ 328.3(a)(3–4),
(c)(6). A lake, pond or impoundment does not lose its jurisdictional status if it contributes
surface water flow to a downstream jurisdictional water in a typical year through a channelized non-jurisdictional surface water feature, through a culvert, dike, spillway, or similar
artificial feature, or through a debris pile, boulder field, or similar natural feature. Id. It
is also jurisdictional if it is inundated by flooding from a water in categories (1)(i), (ii),
and (iii) above. Id. § 328.3(c)(6).
378
Id. § 328.3(c)(1)(i)–(iv).
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flow” into a jurisdictional water in category 1(i) “in a typical year either
directly or through” a tributary; lake, pond, or impoundment of jurisdictional water; or adjacent wetland.379 A tributary must be perennial380 or
intermittent381 in a typical year.382
The NWPR defines adjacent wetlands383 as those that:
(A)

(B)
(C)

(D)

abut, meaning to touch at least one point or side of,
a water identified in category (1)(i), (ii), or (iii)
above;
are inundated by flooding from a water identified
in category (1)(i), (ii), or (iii) above in a typical year;
are physically separated from a water identified in
category (1)(i), (ii), or (iii) above only by a natural
berm, bank, dune, or similar natural feature, or;
are physically separated from a water identified in
category (1)(i), (ii), or (iii) above only by an artificial dike, barrier, or similar artificial structure so
long as that structure allows for a direct hydrologic
surface connection between the wetlands and the
water identified in category (1)(i), (ii), or (iii) above
in a typical year, such as through a culvert, flood or
tide gate, pump, or similar artificial feature.384

“An adjacent wetland is jurisdictional in its entirety when a road
or similar artificial structure divides the wetland, so long as the structure allows for a direct hydrologic surface connection through or over
that structure in a typical year.”385
379

Id. § 328.3(c)(12).
Perennial is defined as having “surface water flowing continuously year-round.” Id.
§ 328.3(c)(8), (12).
381
Intermittent is defined as “surface water flowing continuously during certain times of
the year and more than in direct response to precipitation (e.g., seasonally when the
groundwater table is elevated or when snowpack melts).” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(5).
382
Id. § 328.3(c)(12).
383
“Wetlands” are “areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater at
a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.
Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.” Id. § 328.3(c)(16).
384
Id. § 328.3(c)(1).
385
Id. § 328.3(b)(iv).
380
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Non-jurisdictional Waters

The NWPR excludes the following categories from the definition
of “waters of the United States,” meaning the CWA is inapplicable:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

(vi)
(vii)

386

Waters or water features not identified as “jurisdictional waters” under this definition;
Groundwater, including groundwater drained
through subsurface drainage systems;
Ephemeral386 features, including ephemeral streams,
swales, gullies, rills, and pools;
Diffuse stormwater run-off and directional sheet
flow over upland;
Ditches that are not waters identified in Section
(1)(i) or (ii) of the definition, and those portions of
ditched constructed in waters identified in Section
(1)(iv) of this definition that do not satisfy the definition of adjacent wetlands;
Prior converted cropland;387
Artificially irrigated areas, including fields flooded
for ag production, that would revert to upland388

“Surface water flowing or pooling only in direct response to precipitation (e.g., rain or
snow fall).” Id. § 328.3(c)(3).
387
The Obama Rule did not define prior converted cropland, but the Trump Rule did
include the following definition: Any area that, prior to 12/23/85, was “drained or otherwise manipulated for the purpose, or having the effect, of making production” of agricultural products possible. The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of
the United States,” 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,320 (Apr. 21, 2020). Designations made by the
USDA will be recognized. Id. at 22,320. An area is no longer considered prior converted
cropland when the area is abandoned and has reverted to wetlands. Id. at 22,326.
Abandonment occurs when prior converted cropland is not used for, or in support of,
agricultural purposes at least once in the immediately preceding 5 years. Id.
388
Any “area that under normal circumstances does not satisfy all three wetland factors
(i.e., hydrology, hydrophobic vegetation, hydric soils) . . . and does not lie below the ordinary
high water mark or the high tide line of a jurisdictional water.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(14). The
ordinary high-water mark is defined as:
that line on the shore established by the fluctuations of water and indicated by physical characteristics such as a clear, natural line impressed
on the bank, shelving, changes in the character of soil, destruction of
terrestrial vegetation, the presence of litter and debris, or other appropriate means that consider the characteristics of the surrounding areas.
Id. § 328.3(c)(7). The high tide line is defined as “the line of intersection of the land with
the water’s surface at the maximum height reached by a rising tide.” Id. § 328.3(c)(4). In
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should application of irrigation water to that area
cease;
Artificial lakes and ponds, including water storage
reservoirs and farm, irrigation, stock watering, and
log cleaning ponds, constructed or excavated in upland or non-jurisdictional waters, so long as those
artificial lakes and ponds are not impoundments of
jurisdictional waters that meet the definitions of
“lakes and ponds and impoundments of jurisdictional waters” discussed in section (1)(iii) above;
Water-filled depressions constructed or excavated
in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters incidental
to mining or construction activity, and pits excavated in upland or non-jurisdictional waters for the
purpose of obtaining fill, sand, or gravel;
Stormwater control features constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters to
convey, treat, infiltrate, or store stormwater runoff;
Groundwater recharge, water reuse, and wastewater
recycling structures, including detention, retention,
and infiltration basins and ponds, constructed or
excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters; and
Waste treatment systems.389

Litigation

As was the case with the WOTUS Rule, the ink was not dry on the
final NWPR when lawsuits began flooding in.390 Extremely broad in
the absence of actual data, this may be determined “by a line of oil or scum along the shore
objects, a more or less continuous deposit of fine shell or debris on the foreshore or berm,
other physical markings or characteristics, vegetation lines, tidal gages, or other suitable
means that delineate the general height reached by a rising tide.” Id. The line includes:
spring high tides and other high tides that occur with periodic frequency but does not include storm surges in which there is a departure
from the normal or predicated reach of the tide due to the piling up of
water against a coast by strong winds, such as those accompanying a
hurricane or other intense storm.
Id.
389
40 C.F.R. § 120.2(2)(i)–(xxi) (2020).
390
Clean Water Rule Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054
(June 29, 2015); see infra discussion note 391.
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scope, some claim the NWPR is too narrowly written, while others claim
the provisions are overly broad.391

391

See Complaint at 3, Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. United States EPA, No. CV-20-00266-TUC
-RM, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163921 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021) (claiming NWPR is contrary
to the purpose of the Clean Water Act and arbitrary and capricious because it did not
analyze the scientific importance of protecting ephemeral and intermittent streams); Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at 1–3, State of California et al. v. Wheeler, No. 3:20-cv-03005-RS,
467 F. Supp. 3d 864 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (several states claim NWPR fails to properly interpret Clean Water Act, fails to consider prior factual findings and fails to provide a reasoned explanation to change long-term policy); Complaint at 2–6, State of California, et
al. v. Wheeler, No. 3:20-cv-4869 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2020) (lawsuit by California, Washington,
New York, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia claiming rule arbitrary and
capricious in disregarding prior agency policy and failure to consider statutory objective);
Colorado v. United States EPA, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1311–13 (D. Colo. 2020) (motion
for injunction granted for Colorado finding likelihood of success on the merits arguing
that Rapanos already foreclosed this approach because five justices rejected Scalia’s
similar definitional approach); Complaint at 3–5, 33–36, Environmental Integrity Project
v. Wheeler, No. 1:20-cv-1734 (D.D.C. June 25, 2020) (interpretation foreclosed by Rapanos,
failure to consider relevant and important factors in drafting rule, no reasonable basis
for departing from scientific evidence, prior factual findings, or policy and practice);
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 13, 26, New Mexico Cattle Growers’ Assn. v. United
States EPA., Case No. 1:19-cv-00988-RB-SCY (D.N.M. May 26, 2020) (arguing that
NWPR and 1986 definition are both too broad and advocating for definition of “waters
used in commerce”); Complaint at 37–40, Navajo Nation v. Wheeler, Case No. 2:20-CV
-00602-MV-GJF, Doc. (D.N.M. June 22, 2020) (failure to consider impact of new rule on
tribal waters and treaty rights and failure to consider whether Recession Rule and NWPR
frustrate or promote the Clean Water Act’s purpose); Complaint at 7–8, South Carolina
Coastal Conservation League v. Wheeler, No. 2:20-CV-01687-DCN (D.S.C. Apr. 29, 2020)
(allege arbitrary and capricious reversal of policy and failure to allow meaningful opportunity
to comment on rule); Complaint at 12–14, 27–28, Puget Soundkeeper All. v. United States
EPA, No. 2:20-cv-00950 (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2020) (arguing that exclusion of interstate
waters, elimination of ephemeral waters under the definition of tributaries, and other
various changes in the 2020 WOTUS Rule, the Plaintiffs assert the 2020 rule is contrary
to the Clean Water Act and that action was arbitrary and capricious for failure to explain
change in position); Second Amended Complaint at 36–43, Washington Cattlemen’s Ass’n
v. United States EPA, No. 2:19-cv-00569-JCC (W.D. Wash. May 4, 2020) (amended complaint filed challenging 2020 Rule’s regulation of all intermittent tributaries, nonnavigable perennial tributaries, and non-navigable lakes and ponds, and non-abutting
wetlands); Plaintiff’s Reply Brief in Support of Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
12, Oregon Cattlemen’s Ass’n v. United States EPA, No. 3:19-cv-00564-AC (D. Or. July 20,
2020) (seeking to enjoin application of intermittent tributary and non-abutting wetlands
provisions); Complaint at 26–27, Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Wheeler, No. 1:20-cv
-01064-GLR (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2020) (violations of APA and notice and comment rule-making
for changing agency direction); Amended Complaint at 4, 31–32, Conservation Law Found.
v. United States EPA, No. 20-cv-10820-DPW (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 2020) (arbitrary and
capricious, violates Clean Water Act, violates Endangered Species Act).
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On August 30, 2021, the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona granted the EPA’s voluntary motion for remand of the
NWPR and vacated the NWPR.392 Shortly thereafter, the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts noted that in light of the
Arizona decision, “the most orderly means for me to assist in resolving
the larger dispute over the Rule is to remand this case to the agencies
and correlatively dismiss it without separately addressing the merits to
which the litigation is in an advanced state in the District of Arizona.”393
On the heels of these two decisions, the EPA issued a statement on its
website that in light of the Arizona decision, the EPA would halt the
implementation of the NWPR and would interpret the Clean Water Act
based on the pre-WOTUS Rule regulatory regime until further notice.394
IV.

FINDING COMMON GROUND AND IDENTIFYING DIFFERENCES

A line-by-line comparison of the rules and Supreme Court interpretation proves useful.
A.

Where the Rules Agree

A focus only on where the two rules have significant differences
belies the fact that there are significant areas—both with regard to those
waters included and those waters excluded—that align under both the
WOTUS Rule and the NWPR.
1.

Jurisdictional

Both rules provide that waters currently used, previously used,
or which may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce in
the future, including waters subject to the tide’s ebb and flow, are jurisdictional.395 Similarly, both definitions clearly include the territorial seas
as jurisdictional waters.396 Finally, both rules include impoundments of
392

Pasqua Yaqui Tribe v. EPA, No. CV-20-00266-TUC-RM, Order (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021).
Conservation Law Foundation v. EPA, No. 20-10820-DPW, Memorandum and Order
of Remand and Dismissal (D. Mass. Sept 1, 2021).
394
EPA, Definition of ‘Waters of the United States: Rule Status and Litigation Update,
available at https://www.epa.gov/wotus/definition-waters-united-states-rule-status-and
-litigation-update (https://perma.cc/V7M8-HFL6) (last visited Nov. 3, 2021).
395
Compare 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) (2015), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (a)(1) (2020).
396
Compare 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(6) (2015), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (a)(1) (2020).
393
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jurisdictional waters as being included in the definition of “waters of the
United States.”397 Additionally, the definition of “wetlands” is identical
in both of the rules as well.398
2.

Non-jurisdictional

Similarly, both definitions exclude certain water features from the
definition of waters of the United States.399
Groundwater, including groundwater drained through subsurface
drainage systems, is not considered jurisdictional under either the
WOTUS Rule or the NWPR.400
Likewise, both administrations agree that prior converted cropland,
wastewater treatment systems, stormwater control features constructed
to convey, treat, infiltrate, or store stormwater run-off, water-filled depressions constructed or created incidentally to mining or construction or pits
excavated for obtaining fill, sand, or gravel, artificially irrigated areas
that would revert to dry land should irrigation cease, artificially constructed lakes and ponds, including water storage reservoirs and farm,
irrigation, stock watering and log cleaning ponds, and wastewater recycling structures are expressly excluded from being jurisdictional under
both definitions.401
B.

Where the Rules Diverge

However, several areas of confusion and disagreement regarding
the scope of waters of the United States definition exist between the two
rules.402 This section focuses on six of the main areas of contention.
1.

Tributaries

The scope of the term “tributary” proved contentious during the
history of WOTUS disputes.403 The term remained undefined in any
formal way until the Obama Rule.
397

Compare 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(4) (2015), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2020).
Compare 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2015), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(16) (2020).
399
Compare 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(1)–(7) (2015), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(1)–(12) (2020).
400
Compare 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(5) (2015), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(2) (2020).
401
Compare 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(b)(1)–(2), (b)(4)(i)–(ii), (v), (b)(6)–(7) (2015), with 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(b)(6)–(12) (2020).
402
See discussion infra Sections IV.B.1–6.
403
See discussion infra Section IV.B.1.a.
398

52
a.

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 46:1

Case Law

In Rapanos, Justice Kennedy joined the four-justice plurality in
refusing to defer to the Corps’s broad application of the term.404 The
plurality held that waters of the United States include only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water
“forming geographical features” that are described in ordinary parlance
as “streams,” “oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,” and does not include channels
through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels
that periodically provide drainage or rainfall.”405
The plurality focused on the distinction between “point source”
and “navigable waters,” emphasizing that a tributary must be a waterway.406 The language of the statute indicates that “navigable waters”
differ from a “point source” and that a point source is therefore not a navigable water.407 Many of the conduits classified by the Corps and lower
courts as tributaries are actually point sources.408
The plurality also addressed the Corps’s interpretation of its regulations to include ephemeral streams and drainage ditches as tributaries
and, therefore, as waters of the United States,409 noting that “man-made,
intermittently flowing features, such as ‘drain tiles, storm drains systems and culverts’” had been interpreted by the Corps as tributaries.410
Even after SWANCC, the lower courts continued to uphold
the Corps’ sweeping assertions of jurisdiction over ephemeral channels and drains as ‘tributaries.’ For example,
courts have held that jurisdictional ‘tributaries’ include
the ‘intermittent flow of surface water through approximately 2.4 miles of natural streams and manmade ditches
(paralleling and crossing under I-64),’ Treacy v. Newdunn
Assoc., 344 F.3d 407, 410 (4th Cir. 2003); a “roadside ditch”
whose water took “a winding, thirty-two mile path to the
Chesapeake Bay,” United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698,
702 (4th Cir. 2003); irrigation ditches and drains that

404

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 782 (2006).
Id. at 732–33.
406
Id. at 735.
407
Id. at 743.
408
Id. at 743–44; see also supra Section II.E.2.
409
Id. at 725.
410
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 727–28.
405
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intermittently connect to covered waters, Community Assn.
for Restoration of Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305
F.3d 943, 954–955 (9th Cir. 2002); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2001); and
(most implausibly of all) the “washes and arroyos” of an
“arid development site,” located in the middle of the desert,
through which “water courses . . . during periods of heavy
rain,” Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113,
1118 (9th Cir. 2005).411
Justice Kennedy also would not defer to the Corps’s existing standard for tributaries.412 The Corps included as a tributary any water that
feeds into a traditional navigable water or a tributary of a navigable water
and possesses an ordinary high-water mark.413 This standard is overbroad,
allowing for “regulation of drains, ditches and streams remote from any
navigable-in-fact water.”414 The concurring opinion concludes that adjacency to navigable-in-fact waters provides a sufficient nexus for regulation, but a significant nexus must be established on a case-by-case basis
for wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries.415 After Rapanos,
courts attempted to apply the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion to determine the scope of the term tributary.416
While both the WOTUS and NWPR rules agree that tributaries
of jurisdictional waters should be included in the definition of waters of
the United States, the definitions differ significantly on what constitutes
a tributary.417
b.

Obama Rule

Under the Obama WOTUS Rule, tributaries of waters that have
been, are currently being, or could be used in the future for interstate
commerce, tributaries of the territorial seas, and tributaries of all interstate waters are considered jurisdictional.418 A “tributary” is defined as
411

Id. at 726–27.
Id. at 781 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
413
Id.
414
Id.
415
Id. at 782 (“Absent more specific regulations, however, the Corps must establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis when it seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency
to nonnavigable tributaries.”).
416
See, e.g., United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007).
417
Compare 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a)(5), (c)(3) (2015), with 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a)(2), (c)(12) (2020).
418
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)–(3), (5) (2015).
412
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“a water that contributes flow, either directly” or through another water,
including an impoundment or jurisdictional waters, that is “characterized by the presence of the physical indicators of a bed and banks and an
ordinary high water mark.”419 A tributary can be either natural, manmade, or man-altered and includes rivers, streams, canals, and ditches
not otherwise excluded.420 A water qualifying as tributary under the Obama
Rule does not lose its tributary status if one or more natural or constructed breaks exist so long as the bed and banks and ordinary highwater mark can be identified upstream of the break421 and does not lose
its status if continuing through a water of the United States that does not
meet the definition of tributary or through a non-jurisdictional water.422
c.

Trump Rule

The NWPR defines a tributary as “a river, stream, or similar naturally occurring surface water channel that contributes surface water
flow to a jurisdictional water in a typical year423 either directly or through
one or more” tributaries; lakes and ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters; or adjacent wetlands.424 “The tributary must be perennial425
or intermittent426 in a typical year.”427 An altered or relocated tributary
retains jurisdictional status so long the waterway continues to meet the
definition.428 A tributary remains jurisdictional if the waterway “contributes surface water flow to a downstream jurisdictional water in a typical
year through a channelized non-jurisdictional surface water feature,
419

Id. § 328.3(e) (defining “ordinary high water mark” as the “line on the shore established
by the fluctuations of water and indicated by physical characteristics such as [a] clear,
natural line impressed on the bank, shelving, changes in the character of soil, destruction
of terrestrial vegetation, the presence of litter and debris, or other appropriate means
that consider the characteristics of the surrounding areas.”).
420
Id. § 328.3(c)(3).
421
Id.
422
Id.
423
Id. § 328.3(c)(12)–(13) (2020) (“The term typical year means when precipitation and
other climatic variables are within the normal periodic range (e.g., seasonally, annually) for
the geographic area of the applicable aquatic resource based on a rolling thirty-year period.”).
424
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)–(4).
425
Id. § 328.3(c)(8) (“The term perennial means surface water flowing continuously yearround.”).
426
Id. § 328.3(c)(5), (c)(12) (“The term intermittent means surface water flowing continuously during certain times of the year and more than in direct response to precipitation
(e.g., seasonally when the groundwater table is elevated or when snowpack melts).”).
427
Id. § 328.3(c)(12).
428
Id.
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through a subterranean river, through a culvert, dam, tunnel, or similar
artificial feature, or through a debris pile, boulder field, or similar natural feature.”429 Ditches that relocate tributaries constructed in a tributary
or constructed in an adjacent wetland are included so long as the ditch
satisfies the definition of tributary.430
d.

Comparison

Several key differences in the two definitions of tributary exist.
First, the WOTUS Rule considers any water contributing flow to a jurisdictional water characterized by the presence of a bed and banks and
ordinary high-water mark to be a tributary.431 At the same time, the
Trump Rule limits the scope to those perennial or intermittent waters
contributing flow to a jurisdictional water in a typical year.432 The Trump
Rule is likely based on the Rapanos plurality, which defined tributary as
“relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water
‘forming geographic features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as
‘streams[, . . .] oceans, rivers, [and] lakes. . . .’”433 The Rapanos plurality
would not include as tributaries “channels through which water flows
intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide
drainage for rainfall.”434 The Obama Rule, on the other hand, appears to
harken back to the 2000 Guidance Document, providing that ephemeral
streams that are tributary to a water of the United States were WOTUS
if they possess an ordinary high-water mark.435 Thus, the Obama Rule
would allow intermittent, perennial, or ephemeral streams to be tributaries. The Trump Rule would allow only intermittent or perennial streams
to be tributaries. Interestingly, the Rapanos plurality would have taken
the narrowest approach, allowing only perennial streams to be included.
Second, the WOTUS Rule broadly applies to natural, man-made, or
man-altered waters, while the NWPR discusses only “naturally occurring
surface water channels.”436 This analysis appears to be the first time a
429

Id. § 328.3(c)(12).
Id.
431
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(3) (2015).
432
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(12) (2020).
433
See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (alterations in original).
434
Id. at 716.
435
See Final Notice of Issuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits, 65 Fed. Reg.
12,818, 12,823 (2000).
436
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(3) (2015). The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of
“Waters of the United States,” 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,251, 22,292 (Apr. 21, 2020).
430
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natural versus man-made distinction has been drawn with regard to
tributaries.
Third, the Trump Rule limits a tributary to only those waters that
flow perennially or intermittently, expressly excluding any ephemeral
flow.437 The Obama Rule included ephemeral streams so long as they
satisfied the definitional requirements, and this inclusion was a significant
cause of criticism from opponents of the Obama Rule.438 Interestingly,
both definitions are broader in this aspect than Justice Scalia’s Rapanos
opinion, which expressly excluded intermittent streams.439
Finally, while the Obama Rule focuses on waters with ordinary
high-water marks and visible bed and banks, the Trump Rule does not
include these topographical features.440 This language from the Obama
Rule is strikingly similar to that addressed by the Rapanos Court. There,
the Corps defined tributary as any water that “feeds into a traditional
navigable water (or a tributary thereof) and possesses an ordinary highwater mark.”441 This was rejected by the plurality, which would require
a relatively permanent or continuously flowing water body, as well as by
Justice Kennedy, who refused to defer to the agency’s overbroad definition of tributary.442 The only difference between the Corps’s rule rejected
in Rapanos and the Obama Rule is the latter’s inclusion of a requirement
of the physical indicators of a bed and bank.
2.

Adjacency

The most litigated issue with regard to the scope of the waters of
the United States definition is that of adjacency.443 What began in a
437

See Mark Ryan & Betsy Southerland, Undoing the Trump Water Rule, HILL (Sept. 3,
2021), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/570656-undoing-the-trump-water
-rule [https://perma.cc/9GBW-SXUX].
438
Karen Winters, US EPA and the Corps Finally Publish Their Definition of “Waters of
the United States” Narrowing the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water
Act, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS: FRESH (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.freshlawblog.com/2020
/04/23/us-epa-and-the-corps-finally-publish-their-definition-of-waters-of-the-united-states
-narrowing-the-scope-of-federal-jurisdiction-under-the-clean-water-act/ [https://perma
.cc/TEL3-B7D4].
439
See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 733–34, 736.
440
See James Bradbury et al., Obama, Trump & Biden: Where Are We Now on Regulation
of Federal Waters Under the Clean Water Act, 14TH ANN. JOHN HUFFAKER AGRIC. L. 1, 1,
4 (2021), https://agrilife.org/texasaglaw/files/2021/07/Obama-Trump-Biden.pdf [https://
perma.cc/979K-N732].
441
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781.
442
Id. at 739, 742, 782.
443
See supra Sections IV.B.2.a–d.
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unanimous decision in Riverside Bayview has morphed into a complex
issue, which has left courts, legal scholars, and landowners scratching their
heads. The issue of adjacency is likely the point at which the WOTUS
Rule and NWPR diverge most starkly.
a.

Case Law

Riverside Bayview arguably444 found that adjacent means “physically abutting,” not merely “nearby.”445 In his SWANCC opinion, Justice
Rehnquist described the Riverside Bayview case as addressing “wetlands
that actually abutted on a navigable waterway.”446 Justice Scalia summarized that holding as deference to the Corps’s interpretation that “the
waters of the United States” included “wetlands that “‘actually abut[ted]
on’ traditional navigable waters.”447
SWANCC then held that isolated waters were not jurisdictional.448
The Corps had attempted to base jurisdiction on the Migratory Bird Rule,
a rule based on interstate visitors generating interstate commerce.449 The
majority rejected that proposition, finding that Congress clearly intended
to exclude isolated waters from the jurisdiction.450 The majority in
SWANCC focused on the deference issue in finding clear Congressional
intent, but also stated that “the significant nexus between the wetlands
and ‘navigable waters’ . . . informed [the Court’s] reading of the CWA in
Riverside Bayview Homes.”451
444
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in SWANCC described the factual scenario in
Riverside Bayview as “an 80-acre parcel of low-lying marshy land that was not itself navigable, directly adjacent to navigable water, or even hydrologically connected to navigable
water, but which was part of a larger area, characterized by poor drainage, that ultimately
abutted a navigable creek.” Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 175–76 (2001) (Stevens, J. dissenting). It is unclear
whether he believed the wetlands did not actually abut, particularly because in his Rapanos
dissent, he wrote “the particular wetland at issue in Riverside Bayview abutted a navigable
creek.” See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
445
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 748.
446
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 167.
447
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 725.
448
See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 170–71.
449
Id. at 170.
450
See id. at 170, 174.
451
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 167. Although the Riverside
Bayview Court failed to refer “nexus” at any point, the Court presumably refers to Footnote
9 of the Riverside Bayview opinion, referring to “wetlands that are . . . significantly intertwined with the ecosystem of adjacent waterways.” See United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139, n.9 (1985).
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Next, the plurality opinion in Rapanos discussed the Corps’s interpretation of adjacency.452 It opined that interpretations went far beyond
Riverside Bayview’s holding, which the plurality believed was limited to
situations of actual abutment.453 For example, the Court cited interpretations that include wetlands connected through “directional sheet flow
during storm events,” lying within the 100-year flood-plain, or within 200
feet of a navigable waterway as adjacent.454 The plurality felt that adjacent should be limited to actual abutment.455
The plurality also opined that Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus
test improperly expands the narrow foundation of significant nexus in
Riverside Bayview.456 In the plurality’s view, Riverside Bayview found that
abutment was the significant nexus.457 However, since Riverside Bayview
never used the term significant nexus, a true meaning proves elusive.
In addition, Justice Scalia set out, in the plurality’s view, the correct
standard to determine adjacency.458 To be adjacent, wetlands must “[possess] a continuous surface connection that creates the boundary-drawing
problem . . . addressed in Riverside Bayview.”459 When Justice Scalia
referred to surface connection, he presumably intended to articulate the
fact that the wetland extended to the boundary (abutted) the navigable
water in Riverside Bayview. Note that the plurality did not require “surface
water connection,” as some commentators seem to infer.460 A groundwater
connection existed in Riverside Bayview, another fact that indicates that
Justice Scalia was referring to actual abutment.461
The concurring opinion in Rapanos concludes that wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters provide a sufficient nexus for regulation,
but a significant nexus must be established on a case-by-case basis for
wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries.462 The dissenters in
Rapanos would have deferred to the agency.

452

See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 718, 728.
See id. at 741, 753.
454
Id. at 728.
455
See id. at 740, 748–49.
456
See id. at 753–54.
457
See id. at 728.
458
See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742.
459
Id. at 757.
460
The plurality opinion refers to “surface water connection” twice, both times with
reference to a lower court decision. Id. at 717, 720, 742, 762–63.
461
See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
462
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 718, 782 (“Given the potential overbreadth of the Corps’s regulations, this showing is necessary to avoid unreasonable applications of the statute.”).
453
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Obama Rule

The Obama definition includes “all waters adjacent to” a jurisdictional water, “including wetlands, ponds, lakes, oxbows, impoundments,
and similar waters.”463 Key to this is the WOTUS Rule’s definition using
three terms: waters, adjacent, and neighboring.464
First, the WOTUS Rule refers to all “waters” adjacent to a jurisdictional water, while historically, the regulations and court had referred
to all “wetlands” adjacent to a jurisdictional water.465 Certainly, the term
water seems more broad than wetlands where wetlands are defined as
“those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater
at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for
life in saturated soil conditions.”466 Further, wetlands generally consist
of “swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.”467
Second, adjacent is defined as “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring” a jurisdictional water.468 This definition comes from the 1993 Rule.469
It includes “waters separated by constructed dikes or barriers, natural
river berms, beach dunes and the like.”470 With regard to open waters such
as lakes or ponds, the adjacent waters include any wetlands within or
abutting the ordinary highwater mark.471 Importantly, adjacent waters are
not limited to those located laterally to a jurisdictional water.472 Instead,
adjacent waters include “all waters that connect segments of a” jurisdictional water or are located at the head of a jurisdictional water “and are
bordering, contiguous, or neighboring” said water.473 Expressly excluded
as not adjacent are waters being used for established normal farming,
ranching, and silviculture activities.474
Third, since adjacent is defined as those waters “neighboring” a
jurisdictional water, the definition of neighboring is critical.475 The WOTUS
463

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(6) (2015).
Id. § 328.3(a), (c)(1–2).
465
Id. § 328.3(a)(6); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7) (1993).
466
33 C.F.R. §§ 328.1, 328.3(b) (2015).
467
Id. § 328.3(b).
468
See id. § 328.3(c).
469
See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (1993).
470
Id. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(1) (2015).
471
Id.
472
Id. § 328.3(a)(7).
473
Id. § 328.3(c)(1).
474
Id.
475
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (2015).
464
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Rule provides a three-prong definition of neighboring: (1) all waters within
100 feet of the ordinary high-water mark of a jurisdictional water; and
(2) all waters located within the 100-year flood-plain of a jurisdictional
water and not more than 1,500 feet from the ordinary high-water mark
of any such water; and (3) all waters within 1,500 feet of the high tide line
of a water used, previously used, or susceptible to use in interstate commerce, interstate waters, or the territorial seas, and all waters within
1,500 feet of the ordinary high-water mark of the Great Lakes.476 For
each of these categories, if any portion of a water falls within the neighboring definition, the entire water is deemed neighboring.477
c.

Trump Rule

The Trump Rule includes adjacent wetlands, familiar language
that had historically been included for decades in prior rules.478 The
NWPR provides a four-prong test to define “adjacent wetlands” as those
that: (1) abut, meaning to touch at least at one point or side, a jurisdictional water; (2) are inundated by flooding by a jurisdictional water in a
typical year; (3) are physically separated from a jurisdictional water by
only a natural berm, bank, dune or similar natural feature; and (4) are
physically separated by a jurisdictional water by only an artificial dike,
barrier, or some similar artificial structure that allows for a direct hydrologic surface connection between the wetlands and jurisdictional water
in a typical year, such as through a culvert, flood or tide gate, pump, or
similar artificial feature.479 “An adjacent wetland is jurisdictional in its
entirety” only if “a road or similar artificial structure divides the wetland,
as long as the structure allows for a direct hydrologic surface connection
exist through or over that structure in a typical year.”480
d.

Comparison

Perhaps the easiest distinction to recognize is that the Obama
Rule includes all adjacent waters as jurisdictional, while the Trump Rule
and prior versions of the definition limit the scope of the Act to adjacent
476

Id. § 328.3(c)(2).
See id. § 328.3(a)(6).
478
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(4) (2020). See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7) (2015); see also 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(7) (1993).
479
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(1)(i)–(iv) (2020).
480
Id. § 328.3 (c)(1)(iv).
477
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wetlands.481 The text of the Obama Rule, therefore, represents a significant departure.
Throughout the history of the regulations under the CWA and
precursors to the CWA, “adjacent wetlands” were a covered category of
waters of the United States.482 Riverside Bayview addresses an adjacent
wetland and does not address adjacent waters.483 Inclusion of adjacent
waters as jurisdictional would further expand the CWA’s scope than any
prior interpretation. Furthermore, the addition would allow more “chain”
compilations to include waters within jurisdictions. For example, a nonnavigable water adjacent to a tributary of a tributary of a tributary of a
navigable waterway.
The more complex comparison is to look at the definitions of adjacency. The Obama Rule takes the broadest approach, appearing to go
beyond even the prior cases. While Riverside Bayview held that abutting
wetlands were jurisdictional, and five justices in Rapanos would have
deferred to the agency definition, the Obama Rule used a more objective
approach based primarily on distance.484 Arguably, in reaching this brightline, objective standard, the WOTUS Rule expands the scope of adjacency.
For example, all waters within certain distances of ordinary high-water
marks, flood-plains, and high tide lines of jurisdictional waters are deemed
adjacent, regardless of whether they actually touch or have any proven
hydrologic connection.485 This rule was found to be unlawfully broad, as
there was simply not a sufficient explanation for how these objective measurements were selected.486 “Selecting a 100-year flood-plain on this basis
may well be practical and convenient, but it does not show how or why
the waters within that floodplain, as opposed to a different flood-plain,
have a significant nexus to navigable waters.”487
However, in Rapanos, both the four-Justice dissent and the Justice
Kennedy concurrence deferred to the Corps’s definition, which includes
“neighboring” and “nearby” wetlands, not requiring actual abutment.488
481

See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(6) (2015); see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(4), (c)(1), (c)(1)(iv) (2020).
See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(2), (7) (2015); see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c)(2) (1993).
483
See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
484
See Clean Water Rule Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054,
37,071 (June 29, 2015) [hereinafter Clean Water Rule].
485
Id.
486
Georgia v. Wheeler, 418 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1367 (S.D. Ga. 2019) (“Rapanos requires
that the Agencies demonstrate that waters within a chosen limit have a significant nexus,
and merely stating that the Agencies have decided that a significant nexus exists based
on ‘science’ and their ‘expertise’ is not sufficient.”).
487
Id. at 1366.
488
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 775 (2006).
482
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The NWPR seems to fall somewhere in the middle, focusing on waters
that actually touch a jurisdictional water and those inundated by flooding from a jurisdictional water in a given year. While perhaps less easy
to measure with a ruler, this rule certainly appears narrower in scope
than the WOTUS definition. However, it would expand on the actual
abutting requirement addressed in Riverside Bayview.489
Additionally, the Obama Rule provides that if any part of a water
falls within the measurable distance from flood-plains, ordinary highwater marks, or high tide lines, the entire water is jurisdictional.490 Yet,
the Trump Rule provides that an entire wetland is jurisdictional only if
it maintains a direct hydrologic surface connection through or over a
dividing artificial structure in a typical year.491 The Supreme Court has
not addressed this issue in prior cases.
3.

Interstate Waters

The Trump Rule marked a departure from the decades-old inclusion of “interstate waters, including interstate wetlands” as part of the
waters of the United States definition. Even in 1980, the definition included this category of water, which continued through the Obama Rule.492
However, the NWPR contains no provision for including waters or wetlands solely by virtue of them being interstate.493 Instead, an interstate
water would have to satisfy otherwise one of the four categories identified as waters of the United States to be jurisdictional.494
Seemingly, the Obama definition could be problematic under
Supreme Court precedent. For example, the SWANCC opinion was clear
that isolated wetlands were not jurisdictional.495 However, there could
certainly be an isolated wetland sitting on two states’ boundary, which
would qualify as an interstate water. This reasoning certainly seems to
fall in line with Justice Kennedy’s concern in Rapanos that such an
interpretation would “read out the central requirement that the word
489
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navigable . . . be given some importance.”496 Without imposing any sort
of limitation or significant nexus requirement, this portion of the Obama
Rule seems sweeping and potentially problematic.
Further, the breadth of interstate waters becomes more problematic when one considers that all tributaries of and wetlands adjacent to
interstate waters are also jurisdictional. Accordingly, it is not only an
isolated wetland like that in SWANCC, but also the WOTUS Rule would
consider the water jurisdictional if it crossed interstate lines. Also included could be any waters within the 100-year flood-plain and not more
than 1,500 feet from the ordinary high-water mark of the interstate
water. Likewise, it could include a stream or other water with a bed, bank,
and ordinary high-water mark that contributes flow to the interstate
water. This dilemma is an example of the turtle stacking that concerned
Justice Scalia in his Rapanos opinion.497
4.

Ditches

“Ditches and canals” have been held to be navigable waters if they
meet the definition of tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters.498 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed ditches in two cases.499 In one, water
from a wetland flowed from a wetland to a roadside ditch, then into a culvert on the other side of the road.500 From the culvert, the water flowed
into a second ditch, which flowed into a creek that formed a tributary of
Wicomico River, a navigable water.501 The distance from the wetlands to
the navigable waters was approximately eight miles.502 The court found
the wetland jurisdictional.503
In Newdunn, water flows intermittently from wetlands on the
subject property through a series of natural and man-made waterways,
including ditches and Stony Run, and eventually to navigable waters.504
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The court seemingly found these connections sufficient to show a “sufficient nexus” between navigable-in-fact waters and the wetlands, and
thus jurisdictional.505
Justice Scalia distinguished “ditches, channels, conduits and the
like” from “waters” in his plurality opinion in Rapanos.506 Although both
can hold water permanently, “we usually refer to them as ‘rivers,’ ‘creeks,’
or ‘streams’” when they do constantly retain water.507 The plurality excluded ditches from the definitions of waters and, thus, tributaries.508
The plurality similarly excluded “highly artificial, manufactured, enclosed
conveyance systems,” even with continuous flows of water.509 Therefore,
“continuous flow is a necessary condition for qualification as a ‘water,’ not
an adequate condition.”510
The Obama Rule does not expressly list ditches as something
included in the waters of the United States definition. Instead, the Rule
expressly excluded three categories of ditches from jurisdiction: (1) ditches
with ephemeral flow that are not a relocated tributary or excavated in a
tributary; (2) ditches with intermittent flow that are not a relocated
tributary, excavated in a tributary, or drain wetlands; and (3) ditches that
do not flow, either directly or through another water, into a water used,
previously used, or susceptible to use in interstate commerce, interstate
waters, or the territorial seas.511 Thus, presumably, other ditches that meet
the jurisdictional definition and are not expressly excluded could be
jurisdictional under the WOTUS Rule. The Trump Rule more broadly
excludes ditches.512 The provisions list ditches as being excluded unless
they meet the definition of waters previously used, currently used, or
susceptible to use in interstate commerce, tributaries, or are constructed
in adjacent wetlands.513 In other words, ditches are only jurisdictional if
they otherwise meet the qualifications of jurisdiction, not merely because
they are ditches.
Courts have struggled to determine how ditches fit into the definition of waters of the United States.514 However, although the Obama
505
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Rule and the Trump Rule use different language, the difference in coverage of ditches in the two rules appears to be very similar. In essence,
ditches must independently meet the definition of waters of the United
States under either rule.
5.

Significant Nexus

Indeed, one of the most polarizing topics related to the waters of
the United States definition is the concept of significant nexus. Interestingly, the term was only mentioned in passing by Chief Justice Rehnquist
in SWANCC, where this concept began.515 No discussion or even mention
of the phrase significant nexus appears in the Riverside Bayview opinion.
The Rapanos plurality opinion found that abutment was the significant nexus in Riverside Bayview, and abutment was the only way to
establish a significant nexus.516 Although the Kennedy concurring opinion in Rapanos is often referred to as the significant nexus test, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion would have only applied that test in limited circumstances, namely where the wetland is adjacent to a water other than a
navigable-in-fact water.517 For example, Justice Kennedy would apply the
significant nexus test to a wetland adjacent to a non-navigable tributary
of a navigable water.518 However, the significant nexus test would not
generally apply to water or wetland within 4,000 feet of the ordinary
high-water mark of other waters under Justice Kennedy’s view. Only adjacent wetlands would potentially be found as jurisdictional under the
significant nexus test.
A fairly simple distinction exists between the two rules when it
comes to significant nexus: The Obama Rule includes the test, and the
Trump Rule does not. However, the Obama Rule has been misinterpreted
to conclude any water with a significant nexus is jurisdictional.519 The
Obama Rule simply does not intend that result. Instead, the Obama Rule
provides that certain regional water features bearing a significant nexus
to certain jurisdictional waters are included in the definition of waters
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of the United States.520 Additionally, and more broadly applicable, the
Obama Rule provides that a case-by-case analysis should be determined
to include all waters with a significant nexus to waters: previously, currently, or likely to be used in interstate commerce; the territorial seas;
and interstate waters located within the 100-year flood-plain, within
4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary high-water mark of such waters
are waters of the United States.521 Conversely, under the Trump Rule,
there is no such significant nexus analysis to be conducted, and there are
no case-by-case determinations to be made.522
6.

Chevron Deference

The three U.S. Supreme Court decisions seem to run the gamut
with respect to affording Chevron deference to Corps of Engineers regulations and interpretations under the CWA. In Riverside Bayview, a unanimous Court deferred to the Corps regulation finding that adjacent
wetlands constituted waters of the United States.523
In SWANCC, the majority held that Congress clearly intended to
exclude isolated waters from jurisdiction under the CWA under Step 1
of Chevron.524 The majority went on to opine that, even if Congress had
failed to speak clearly to the point, the justices joining that opinion would
not have deferred to the agency due mainly to constitutional concerns.525
The four dissenting justices, on the other hand, reasoned that Congress
had not spoken clearly and that the Corps’s interpretation, in the form of
the Migratory Bird Rule, was reasonable and worthy of deference.526
Finally, a fractured Court in Rapanos produced a similarly fractured set of opinions on Chevron deference. The plurality opinion did not
defer with respect to interpretations of adjacent or tributary.527 In fact,
the plurality posited its own interpretation of the term, deeming each as
the only reasonable interpretation.528 With respect to adjacency, the plurality found that Riverside Bayview controlled and required abutment.529
520
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Dictionary definitions provided the only reasonable interpretation of
waters, and presumably tributaries, for the plurality.530
Chief Justice Roberts joined the plurality but penned a concurring
opinion lamenting the fact that the Corps had failed to successfully
engage in rule-making after SWANCC, while continuing to act as if the
agency had unlimited authority.531 The Chief Justice pledged deference
if the Corps were to promulgate reasonable regulations.532 A dissenting
justice, Justice Breyer, also filed a separate dissent to object to Justice
Kennedy’s writing a substantial nexus requirement into the CWA.533
Justice Breyer interprets Rapanos as a cry for the Corps to write new
regulations immediately.534
Justice Kennedy represented the swing vote in Rapanos, deferring
to the Corps with respect to adjacency, but finding that the Corps’s interpretation of tributary went too far.535 Like SWANCC, the dissenters in
Rapanos would have deferred to the Corps with respect to adjacency and
tributaries.536
The various opinions muddy the prospects of Chevron deference to
regulations implementing the CWA. Although Chief Justice Roberts joined
three other justices in failing to defer in Rapanos, his concurring opinion
pledges future deference, conditioned, however, on reasonableness.537 In
addition, both the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
presented their findings as absolute and the only reasonable interpretation.538 Given the unique result in Rapanos v. United States,539 a question
arises as to whether the agency must, in essence, defer to the Court.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia found that any deference to the Corps’s interpretation of waters
of the United States has limits.540 The plurality opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts’ concurrence, and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos
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provide those limits.541 Given that Justice Kennedy and the plurality
disagreed on those limits, the boundaries of Justice Kennedy’s significant
nexus test apply.542 Therefore, the extent to which Chevron deference
applies to agency determinations relating to waters of the United States
remains uncertain.
CONCLUSION
An in-depth review of the case law and past and present agency
regulations defining the waters of the United States reveals several
points that should guide future courts and regulators in this murky area
of law.
The focus of the dispute lies mainly on adjacent wetlands. This
inquiry, in turn, implicates the interpretations of adjacency and tributaries. Depending on the situation, these interpretations matter because
chain adjacency formulations result in wetlands that lie over 100 miles
from navigable waters being determined waters of the United States
subject to the CWA.543
We label these cases as tributary of a tributary of a tributary cases.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court opinions fail to directly confront this
issue, the plurality and Kennedy concurrence in Rapanos craft rules that
attempt to limit chain jurisdiction. The plurality limits attenuated claims
of adjacency by requiring adjacency to continuous, relatively permanent
waters, and by defining adjacency as actual abutment.544 This approach
prevents intermittent or ephemeral streams, ditches, and drains from
providing the link between the wetland and the non-abutting navigable
water. Interestingly, this issue seems most concerning within the Obama
Rule, particularly because the Rule includes adjacent waters, along with
the broad definition of a tributary and the geographic requirements
absent any proof of hydrologic connection with regard to adjacency.545
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test posits
that wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters are automatically
regarded as waters of the United States, a narrower category of wetlands
541
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than those that fall within the plurality’s test.546 However, wetlands adjacent to other waters, whether intermittent, ephemeral, or otherwise,
may be jurisdictional if a significant nexus exists.547 The significant nexus
test limits chain jurisdiction, at least in theory. The significant nexus
test makes jurisdiction more open-ended than the plurality test, but not
as open-ended as some courts and commentators believe. Wetlands not
adjacent to some type of water (isolated wetlands) do not qualify as
jurisdictional under Justice Kennedy’s test.
A few points seem to have been resolved by the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions:
(1)

(2)

(3)

Wetlands adjacent (meaning abutting) to navigable
waters are jurisdictional (Riverside Bayview, Rapanos plurality, Rapanos Kennedy concurrence);548
The Corps’s definition of adjacent as examined in
Rapanos is reasonable (Rapanos dissent, Rapanos
Kennedy concurrence);549
The Corps’s interpretation of tributary as it existed
at the time of the Rapanos decision is not reasonable (Rapanos plurality, Rapanos Kennedy concurrence).550

However, since the Court’s makeup has changed significantly
since the Rapanos decision, and some of these conclusions are less than
clear, the Court may not feel compelled to find clear conclusions from these
opinions. Just as interpretations of the 9–0 decision in Riverside Bayview
have received wildly different interpretations, so too might members of
the Court interpret the 5–4 decisions in SWANCC and Rapanos differently. Only Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Breyer, and Thomas
remain among the justices in Rapanos. Only one of those four, Breyer,
dissented.551 The other three were included in the plurality. Replacing
Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, and Stevens are Justices
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Barrett, Gorsuch, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Sotomayor.552 How the new
makeup of Justices might interpret and apply the fractured and complex
Rapanos decision remains to be seen.
An additional unanswered question related to deference is to which
rule the Court would defer. The Obama Rule was published, and lawsuits
filed in 2015.553 Litigation was dismissed or stayed with the Trump
administration’s rescinding the Obama Rule in 2017.554 The Trump Rule
was published in 2020555 but may be in jeopardy with the Biden administration in place. Where there exist competing rules—such as the Obama
and Trump Rules—which would receive the Court’s deference? The rule
reaching the Justices first? Could the Obama Rule reach the Court despite additional rules being promulgated and in place afterwards?
Further, to what extent, if any, must the agency defer to the Court
precedent when drafting rules defining waters of the United States? Certainly, the opinions provide some guidance on how to interpret adjacency
and tributaries, but what if the agency were to completely rewrite a
definition and avoid using these terms? Would this precedent apply?
The history of the debate over the meaning of these five words,
“waters of the United States” has been long, complex, and confusing. While
the debate can be boiled down into questions like “what is an adjacent
wetland” and “what qualifies as a tributary” history has shown that reaching answers to these seemingly simple questions is anything but. In the
midst of this madness, Justice Scalia may have best described this controversy as “turtles all the way down.”556
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